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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Three Code Articles

This article analyzes three quite different provisions of the French Civil
Code.' All three provisions date from the Code's enactment in 1804; none of the
three have been amended by the legislature in the nearly two centuries since the
Code's adoption. One of the provisions (Article 1134(3)) is quite general; it says
no more than contracts "must be performed in good faith."' By contrast, the

Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. The text of the French Civil Code appears in the annual editions of the Dalloz Code Civil.
That work includes, following each article, annotations to the leading case law and doctrinal writing.
For an English translation of the Code, see John H. Crabb, The French Civil Code (1977).
Translations of significant excerpts (including all the provisions discussed in this article) may also
be found in Arthur Taylor von Mehren and James Russell Gordley, The Civil Law System: An
Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law 1163-81 (2d ed. 1977). 1 have relied on the von
Mehren and Gordley translations unless otherwise indicated.
2. C. Civ. art. 1134 reads in full:
1) Agreements lawfully formed take the place of laws for those who have made them.
2) They cannot be revoked except by mutual consent or on grounds allowed by law.
3) They must be performed in good faith.
In this and all subsequent translations of Code articles, I have added paragraph numbers.
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second provision (Article 1591), which applies only to sales contracts, is quite
specific; it commands that the price "must be fixed and stated by the parties. '
The third provision (Article 1129(l)) has neither the generality of Article 1134(3)
nor the specificity of Article 1591, but falls somewhere between the two. It
provides that the "object" of a party's obligation must be "a thing that is specified
at least to its species."" In terms more familiar to a common law lawyer, that
provision requires that the subject matter of a contract be sufficiently definite.'
Two principal considerations explain the selection of these three provisions.
First, their interpretation, and the relationship between them, has generated over
the last twenty-five years an important body of case law. A study of that case law
tells us agood deal about judicial lawmaking in a Code jurisdiction. Second, these
provisions afford an opportunity to analyze how courts in a Code jurisdiction
address the problem of statutory obsolescence. Here the potential villain is Article
1591, the most specific of the three provisions. That article adopts for sales
contracts the Roman law rule on certainty of price. Perhaps that rule was suitable
in Roman times, but it appears wildly unsuited for the modem law of sales.
Understanding how the judges ultimately defused it helps demonstrate that
codification imposes surprisingly few constraints on the development of the law.
The high point ofour story occurred on December 1, 1995. On that day, the
Court of Cassation-France's Supreme Court-determined in a particularly
solemn fashion that a price term was sufficiently definite if it allowed a party to
the contract to set the price. Neither Article 1129(1) nor Article 1591 required

3. C. Civ. art. 1591 reads in full:
The price for the sale must be fixed and stated by the parties.
4. C. Civ. art. 1129 reads in full:
I) The object of an obligation must be a thing that is specified at least to its species.
2) The amount can be uncertain, so long as it can be determined.
5. On Article 1129, see Frangois Terr6 et al., Droit civil. Les obligations n 262, at 218-19
(6th ed. 1996) [hereinafter Terrt, Les obligations] and Barry Nicholas, French Law of Contract 11516 (2d ed. 1992). In the context of bilateral contracts (the subject of this article), the term "thing"
in Article 1129(I) refers to the other party's performance. "Species" C'espice" in French) refers to
the nature of the performance. In addition to imposing a definiteness requirement, Article 1129(1)
reinforces other articles of the Code in requiring that a performance be possible (at least at contract
formation) and licil See Nicholas, supra, at 116-17.
6. The Court announced its new rule in four cases decided by a full Court (Assemblie
pliniare)oftwenty-five judges. Cass. ass. plin., Dec. 1, 1995, D. 1996, Jur. 13, concl. Michel JMol,
note Laurent Aynis, J.C.P. 1996, 11,22565, concl. Michel ,eol, note Jacques Ohestin (Cofratel,
Alcatel, SocidtW Atlantique, and Vassali cases).,
French legal publications rarely cite a case by the parties' names. Rather, the standard citation
form includes the date of the decision or decisions (here December 1, 1995) and the name of the
court (here the Assemblge plnire ofthe Court ofCassation). The hundred plus judges on the Court
of Cassation normally sit in sections (chambres) determined by subject matter; i.e., criminal, civil,
commercial, etc. Only a small number of cases of exceptional importance go to a full Court or
Assembie pliniirecomposed ofjudges from all the sections. (For easy reference, Ihave, whenever
possible, used a party's name when referring to a particular case.).
The principal, unofficial law reports are Dalloz (D.) and Juris-Classeur Periodique (J.C.P.), also
known as La semaine juridique. The reports also include case notes prepared by eminent
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anything additional. The Court then invoked Article 1134(3) to add, in what the
commentators characterized as an obiter dictum, 7 that the party setting the price
had to do so in good faith.' These four decisions marked a spectacular turnaround in the Court's case law. Previously, the Court had nullified contracts
allowing one of the parties, usually the seller, to set the price. Sales contracts
were vulnerable to that fate under Article 1591, and in 1978 the Court interpreted
Article 1129(1) to impose the same certainty requirement on most other
contracts.9 Now all has changed; contracts allowing a party to determine the
price are valid, but the other party may obtain damages (and perhaps termination)
if the party setting the price acts in bad faith.
This outcome, and the judicial saga leading up to it, support at least two
conclusions, the first pretty standard and the second far more controversial. The
standard conclusion emphasizes the important role played by general clauses in
Code jurisdictions. Open-ended texts, such as Article 1134's requirement of
good faith performance, have often served as a means for courts to take into
account contemporary needs when interpreting a Code enacated at a time when
conditions were quite different.' The most famous example of this "Flight into
the General Clauses" occurred in Weimar Germany in the 1920s when the courts
rewrote contracts, disrupted by catastrophic inflation, by invoking the debtor's
obligation to perform in good faith."
A second more controversial conclusion argues that codification need not
constrain that much the development of the law. No doubt codification
encourages judges to look to Code texts for solutions to cases, but many civilian
jurists recognize that textual positivism is an inadequate approach.' It is
jurists-usually by law professors but sometimes by judges. Case citations normally identify the
author of any accompanying note.
7. See the case notes by Professors Aynts and Ghestin cited in supra note 6.

8. American readers will recognize that this is the Uniform Commercial Code rule.
See U.C.C. § 2-305(2) (1997), providing that "a price to be fixed by the seller or by the
buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith." French jurists often invoked Section 2305's flexible approach for determining the validity of a price term as a basis for criticizing
the more rigid pre-1995 French position. See, e.g., the case note by Professor Ghestin to Cass. le
civ., Nov. 29, 1994, J.C.P. 1995, 11,22371 (Alcatel cases). Ironically, the Code's principal drafter,
Karl Llewellyn, appears to have been heavily influenced by Continental jurists, especially by their
use of the concept of commercial reasonableness. James Whitman, Commercial Law and the
American Volk: ANote on Llewellyn 'sGerman Sourcesfor the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 Yale
L.J. 156 (1987).
9. Cass. com., Oct. 11, 1978, D. 1979, Jur. 135, note Robert Houin, J.C.P. 1979,11, 19034,
note Yvon Loussouarn.
10. On general clauses in French Codes, see Ren6 David, French Law. Its Structure, Sources,
and Methodology 194-207 (Michael Kindred trans., 1972).
1I.. John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law 464-74 (1968). The phrase "Flight into the
General Clauses" derives from the title of awell-known book condemning the phenomenon. See J.
W. Hedemann, Die Flucht in die Gencralklauseln (Ttlbingen 1933), discussed in Dawson, supra, at
475.
12. Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe 450-58 (Tony Weir trans., 1995);
Manlio Bellomo, The Common Legal Past ofEurope 1000-1800, at 11-14 (Lydia G.Cochrane trans.,
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inadequate because Codes do not abolish history but are the product of it. They
address a whole range of questions which professionally-trained jurists have
debated for centuries without achieving any definitive resolution. That debate
among jurists on how best to rationalize the law-often called "legal science" by
civilian scholars-does not cease with codification. Therefore, according to the
leading contemporary German scholar Reinhard Zimmermann, the search "for the
most appropriate answer should not be (and is in fact not always) deflected by
an odd quirk in the wording of a code."" Similarly, Frangois G~ny, one of
France's leading private law scholars earlier in this century, minimized the effect
of codification in France by describing it "as little more than an operation of
pure form, simplification, and rearrangement" whose primary effect was to unify
the country.'
The saga of our three Code provisions does not conclusively demonstrate
that Zimmermann and G~ny are correct. However, it does provide some
evidence that Code texts-even very specific ones such as Article 159 1-do not
freeze the law as much as one might fear. When texts fail, either because there
is a gap in the Code (the unforeseen case) or because an obsolete provision
produces an unacceptable result (the unforeseen change ofcircumstances),judges
are tempted to engage in what Gdny called "free scientific research" and what
we would call common-law lawmaking." The predominant view is to deny
that French judges exercise any such powers,' 6 but our saga includes numerous
decisions where the judges appear to have exercised them. As we shall see, the
Court of Cassation's rigorous enforcement of the certainty of price requirement,
and the Court's extension of that requirement to contracts other than sales, is not
explainable through fidelity to Code texts but through a desire to protect the
weaker party in a standardized contract of adhesion from what the Court believed
to be unconscionable price terms. Only when the Court of Cassation was forced

1995). Professor Wieacker defines textual positivism as the courts finding solutions for the cases
before them by an exegesis of the Code. See Wieacker, supra, at 342, 345.
13. Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny's Legacy. Legal History, Comparative Law, and the
Emergence of a European Legal Science, 112 Law Q. Rev. 576, 587 (1996).
14. I Frangois Giny, Mithode d'interpr~tation et sources en droit priv6 positif n*9, at 23 (2d
ed. 1932). Gdny's magisterial study remains one of the preeminent works in France on methods of
interpretation and sources ofprivate law. See Jean-Louis Halpfrin, Histoire du droit privd frangais
depuis 1804, at 182-83 (1996). For an English translation ofthis work, see Frangois Gdny, M~thode
d'interprttation en droit privd positif (La. St. L. Inst. trans., 2d ed. 1954).
15. G~ny limited free scientific research to the former situation of gaps in the Code. I G6ny,
supra note 14, n*85, at 212. Much like Benjamin Cardozo did for the common law in this country,
Gtny addressed the question of how judges should exercise their lawmaking power in an objective
fashion so as to reduce to a minimum the arbitrariness of any personal contribution. Cardozo cited
Geny's M9thode d'interprtation at least eleven times in The Nature ofthe Judicial Process, referring
to it as a "brilliant book." Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 138 (Yale.
paperbound ed., 1971).
16. Michel Troper et al., Statutory Interpretation in France, In Interpreting Statutes: A
Comparative Study 171, 190-91 (D.Neil MacCormick & Robert S.Summers eds., 1991) (stating that
judges find the basis for their decisions in the Code).
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to recognize the havoc wrought by its invalidation of most long-term agreements
for distributing goods did the Court shift gears. Under the new approach, the
courts police the dominant party's behavior at the performance stage under the
rubric of good faith rather than invalidate the contract at the outset because one
party has put the other party at the former's mercy by reserving the power to
determine the price or other performance due.
B. Codification of PrivateLaw
The nineteenth century was the golden age of codification for countries in
the civil law tradition." The century opened with France's adoption in 1804
of its Civil Code and closed in 1896 with a newly-reunited Germany's adoption
of its own Civil Code, effective on January 1, 1900. These two texts, although
different in many ways, both present in statutory form the law of persons,
family, inheritance, property, torts, contracts, and unjust enrichment. Those
private law subjects formed the heart ofthe Corpus Juris Civilis compiled by the
Emperor Justinian in the early sixth century from the writings of leading Roman
jurists; prior to the nineteenth-century codifications, Justinian's work had
enjoyed the status of law on most of the European continent. What was Roman
private law remains the heart of the contemporary legal system for lawyers
trained in the civil law tradition, even if it is no longer directly received as law.
In this age of nation-states, it has become desirable if not necessary for each state
in the civil law tradition to have its own civil code, but all those Codes remain
heavily influenced by Roman law."8 Despite growing American hegemony,
codification remains popular in large areas of the world.' 9
Civil Codes differ from ordinary statutes in a number of ways. First, their

17. Comparativists distinguish between civil
and common law traditions. Loosely speaking,
in the former tradition, Roman law plays a role comparable to that of medieval English law for

countries in the common law tradition. See John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An
Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America 1-4 (2d ed. 1985).
I . On the history ofprivate law codification in the civil law tradition, see I Konrad Zweigert
& Hein Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law 87-99, 149-85 (Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987). On
the case for codification, see Reinhard Zimmermann, Codification:History and Present Significance
of an Idea. A propos the Recodification ofPrivate Law in the Czech Republic, 3 Eur. Rev. Priv. L.
95 (1995) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Codification].

Professor Zimmermann's writings are particularly fruitful because he believes that national
codification, nurtured by ahistorically oriented legal science, provides the best way to achieve private
law harmonization among the members of the European&Union. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Civil
Code and Civil Law. The Europeanization ofPrivate Law Within the European Community and the
Re-emergence of a European Legal Science, I Colum. J. Eur. L. 63, 80-82 (1994). Harmonization,
as fashioned in Brussels, has so far had little impact on the private law of the member States.
Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Parldigm of European
Integration, 3 Eur. L.J. 3, 4 (1997) ("private law remains guarded in the jealous hands of national
institutions ...quite conscious of their 'national' character").
19. Professor Zimmermann reports that more than fifty states have codified or recodified their
private law since 1945. Zimmerman, Codification, supra note 18, at 105.
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coverage is much broader. Indeed, Civil Codes, at least as initially conceived,
cover the whole range of private law. 20 Second, they address that subject
matter in a systematic fashion. A codification is not just a consolidation of
relevant texts found in prior enactments, but a restatement of the applicable law.
At least in theory, any such restatement should be clear, consistent, and complete
so that all the texts appearing in the Code form a coherent whole." Third, a
Code presupposes a certain permanence; codification, like the comparable public
law phenomenon ofconstitution making, requires both the presence of propitious
circumstances and the expenditure of considerable effort. Neither France nor
Germany have ever recodified their private law. As a result, subsequent
generations of jurists do not view Codes as contemporary Americans tend to
view statutes; i.e., as political responses, triggered by special interest groups, to
specific problems. Rather, Codes constitute a body of norms designed for the
long haul. Thus, at least in theory, a Code is the quintessential example of
public-regarding legislation.22
Countries in the common law tradition have adopted a more modest
approach to codifying private law. Codification has had its eminent proponents-Jeremy Bentham in Great Britain and David Dudley Field in this country,
to name only the most prominent-and Grant Gilmore asserts that most
American lawyers in the pre-Civil War decades assumed codification would
occur. 23 What did occur, however, was something quite different. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, legislatures in England and the United
States adopted a small number of statutes (normally called "Acts" rather than
"Codes") covering discrete subject matter areas (primarily negotiable instruments
and the sale of goods). In this country, these enactments took the form of
uniform laws proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on

20. The French Civil Code of 1804 was one of five Codes promulgated in France during the
Napoleonic period. The other Codes governed commercial law, criminal law, criminal procedure,
and civil procedure. In subsequent years, the term "Code" has also been applied to enactments of
lesser scope; e.g., the Labor and Agricultural Codes. These later Codes cover subject areas
previously governed by the Civil Code.
The French Civil Code, like our Uniform Commercial Code, covers both commercial and
consumer contracts. The French Commercial Code contains additional rules for certain commercial
contracts, but that Code has experienced a "slow death" as its provisions have been replaced by more
specialized statutes governing corporations, patents and trademarks, negotiable instruments, etc. See
Denis Tallon, Reforming the Codes in a Civil Law Country, 15 J. Soc. Pub. Tchrs. L. 33, 34 (1980).
21. James Gordley, European CodesandAmerican Restatements: Some Difficulties,81 Colum.
L. Rev. 140 (1981) (doubting theory is attainable). Justinian's Digest-the most significant portion

ofthe CorpusJurisCivilis-was,'onthe other hand, a compilation of earlierjuristic writings deemed
worthy of preservation.
22. French jurists rarely speak in such legal process terms. For an exception, see Bruno
Oppetit, De Iacodification, D. 1996, Chr. 33, 37 (left column).
23. Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 27 (1977). Professor Gilmore's eminently
readable books sometimes suffer from a bit of hyperbole. See Professor Waters' comment on
Gilmore's provocative The Death of Contract. Anthony J.Waters, Book Review, 36 Md. L. Rev.
270, 271 (1976) ("purest hyperbole").
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Uniform State Laws. * These uniform laws functioned as common law statutes;
i.e., the courts continued to develop the law without much attention to the
statutory text.25
Other than in these areas, the common law tradition left the development of
private law largely to the judges. Legislatures might occasionally intervene to
correct some deficiency in the common law-a prime example is the adoption of
Workers' Compensation Acts to correct the courts' mishandling of industrial
accidents-but there was no effort to restate the law systematically (or even
partially), as one would expect in a Code. England flirted briefly in the 1970s
with the prospect of codifying its common law of contract, but the project came
to naught. 6 The principal exception to case law's triumph is the Uniform
Commercial Code, which was approved by the conference in 1952 and subsequently adopted by forty-nine of the fifty states. Only Louisiana, wedded to its
own Civil Code, has resisted the trend. This new uniform act not only covers a
broader swath of territory than did its predecessors, but also utilizes a systematic
approach which makes it resemble in a number of ways a true Code.27
Opponents of codification have argued that a Code has the unfortunate effect
of freezing the law. How can the law develop to accommodate changing
conditions when the applicable rule takes the form of a fixed text, perhaps
enacted many years in the past? A variant of this argument enabled the noted
German jurist Carl Friederich von Savigny to delay codification in Germany for
nearly a century. According to Savigny, law reflects the common consciousness
of the people; like custom, it grows organically over time. Writing in 1814,
Savigny feared that a German codification on the French model would halt this
evolutionary phenomenon.29 Similarly, James Carter, the most prominent

24. Gilmore, supra note 23, at 69-71. Indrafting the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and
the Uniform Sales Act, the Commissioners were heavily influenced by the English Bills of Exchange
Act (1882) and Sale of Goods Act (1893).
25. Id. at 71-72.
26. See Hein Kotz, Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously, 50 Mod. L. Rev. I (1987) (describing,
but not bemoaning, the failure).
27. William D.Hawkland, The Uniform Commercial Codeandthe Civil Codes, 56 La. L. Rev.
231 (1995). Professor Hawkland, who served as one of Karl Llewellyn's assistants in securing the
Code's adoption, argues that Llewellyn (the Code's principal drafter) believed the U.C.C was a true
Code (and not just a big connercial statute), but did not say so publicly because of a perceived
hostility to codification. Id. at 235.
28. See Frederick von Savigny, Ober die Notwendigkcit vines allgemeines borgerlichen Rechts
for Deutschland (1814). The only English translation appeared in 1831. Frederick Charles von
Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence (Abraham Hayward trans.,
Ano Press Reprint 1975). While Savigny's book may be read as a polemic against codification, his
principal point was that Germany was not yet ready for codification. Legal scholars needed more
time to observe and master the historical development of German law. John Henry Merryman et al.,
The Civil Law Tradition: Europe, Latin America, and East Asia 476-77 (1994). Savigny's book
generated eight decades of intense scholarly activity (the Pandectist Movement) which prepared the
way for Germany's 1896 codification. The scholars focussed on Justinian's Digest (also called the
"pandects"), an odd place to learn more about German law.
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opponent of the Field Codes in this country, successfully argued that a Code was
an elitist text that would freeze the law by preventing further development by
popularly-elected judges.29
This "deep freeze" phenomenon is a danger posed by all enacted or
legislative law.3" As explained by Professors Hart and Sacks, enacted law and
decisional law (case law) necessarily take different forms. Statutes owe their
authority to the legislature which gives a particular set of words the force of law.
Case law, on the other hand, is more flexible because it is not imprisoned in a
particular text." Similarly, enacted and case law rules represent a model with
two poles. At one end are rigid legislative rules ("do not drive over 50
mph"), while at the other are open-ended case law rules stating no more
than general principles ("drive at a reasonable speed"). 2 Rigid enacted
rules are workable (at least in theory) because the legislator is available to
change them if experience proves them to be unwise. In reality, legislatures
rarely revisit their earlier work products, and how to respond to obsolete statutes
one of the more pressing problems confronting courts in this
has become
33
country.

Similar problems have arisen in civil law countries that have codified their
private law. The problem is particularly acute in France where the Civil Code,
enacted in 1804, predates the Industrial Revolution. The majority of the original
Code's 2,281 articles have never been amended; those untouched articles include
most of the basic provisions on the law of obligations (i.e., contract, tort,
and unjust enrichment). 4 Not surprisingly, a recent study confirms that
the most pressing issue of statutory interpretation confronting French courts
is the necessity of adapting outdated statutory texts to transformations of
the economy. 3" Judges, forced to decide cases spewed up by the facts
of modem life, often must apply texts enacted with quite different social
situations in mind." That task has proved to be a difficult but not insurmountable one.

29. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 403-04 (2d ed. 1985).
30. Robert E. Keeton, Venturing to Do Justice: Reforming Private Law 82 (1969) ("deep
freeze" caused by legislatures intruding into the area ofprivate law and by courts inevitably refusing
a creative role in statutory interpretation).
31. Henry M. Hart, Jr. &Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law 125-27 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
32. Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence ofthe Uniform Commercial Code, 27
Stan. L. Rev. 621, 633 (1975) (applying Hart & Sacks).
33. Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982).
34. As of 1980, roughly one thousand articles had been amended. The greatest activity has
occurred in the area of family law. Tallon, supra note 20, at 34-35. As of the late 1970s, 1,358
articles of the original Code remained unchanged. Crabb, supra note 1, at 13.
35. Troper et al., supra note 16, at 172. In this exceptionally useful book, national experts
from nine countries respond to a standardized set of questions prepared by the editors.

36.

Id.
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C. Code Interpretation
Interpretation is the principal tool available to the courts for handling
obsolete statutes. In this country, that tool is not particularly effective because
statutory interpretation has become, especially at the federal level, quite textually
based." Fortunately, Code interpretation in France and other civil law countries
tends to be more free-wheeling. In part this difference is attributable to what
might be called the Swiss-cheese phenomenon. A Civil Code, like Swiss cheese,
may have holes, while a statute in a common law system cannot. By definition,
a Code is a systematic, comprehensive restatement of the law; the French Civil
Code, therefore, occupies the entire field of private law by superseding all prior
sources of law.38 If a judge cannot find in the Code a provision to apply for
deciding a case (the judge appears to be in one of those "holes"), then the judge
must look harder, must apply the most analogous provision, or must do
something to find a decisional rule in the Code.
The need to find an applicable rule is particularly acute for the French judge
on account of the deductive logic employed in French judicial opinions; under
the prevailing opinion writing style, the judge must formulate a rule and then
apply it syllogistically to the facts. 9 It is a denial of justice for the judge to
refuse to decide a case on account of the obscurity or insufficiency of the
Code.4 The common law judge, on the other hand, exercises common-law
lawmaking powers whenever statutory texts do not apply. In those cases the
statutory text need not produce an answer. No doubt the coordination of the
adjoining common law with newly-enacted statutory law presents a major
challenge to judges in a non-Code jurisdiction, but that task is not one of
statutory interpretation.4'
There is a second, more basic reason justifying an activist approach by the
courts to Code interpretation. Paradoxically, this justification invokes the
incompleteness of the Code. Its chief proponent was Jean-Marie Portalis, the
most influential of the four jurists selected by Napoleon to draft the Code.
Portalis wrote a lengthy and eloquent introduction to the draft in which he
emphasized its incompleteness. According to Portalis, the Code did no more
than announce general principles "fertile in their consequences"; it was not the
legislature's job to "descend" to the level of detail and anticipate all the cases

37.
38.

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 34 (1994).
When enacting the Civil Code in 1804, the French legislature explicitly denied any further

legal force, in matters covered by the Code, to Roman law, royal ordinances, and general and local
customs. See Article 7of the Law of 30 venttse an XII (1804).
39. Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 Yale J. Int'l L. 81, 93-99
(1994).
40. Article 4 of the Civil Code explicitly so provides.
41. In the past, common law judges have tended to treat
statutes as hostile intruders and have
narrowly interpreted them when they derogated from the common law. More recently, they have
given statutes a more friendly reception and even invoked them as analogies when formulating
common law rules. See Calabiesi, supra note 33, at 85-86.
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that might arise.4" That responsibility belonged to the judges whose task was
to "implement, ramify, and extend those principles" and to "fill" over time the
gaps in the Code.4" For Portalis, the incompleteness of the Code derived not
only from the generality of its provisions, but also from the inability of an
enacted text to stop the flow of human events. He explained:
For the laws, once promulgated, remain as they have been written.
Men, on the other hand, never rest; they always act, and this movement
which never stops, and whose effects are in turn affected by circumstances, produce, at each moment, some new combination, some new
fact, some new result.""
As a result ofthis instability, the legislature does not, properly speaking, "make"
a Code; rather, the Code of a people is made with time.4
Portalis' views, widely acceptedby French jurists today, did not have much
influence in nineteenth-century France. The quite different approach to Code
interpretation that prevailed was that of the Exigetical School." The jurists
associated with this school, mostly law professors but also including some
judges, utilized grammatical, logical, and historical arguments to discover the
intent of the lawmakers. While the school's use of analogy may have been a bit
daring when contrasted with the contemporaneous common law hostility towards
statutes, the Exigetical School's approach remained highly text-based. There was
little interest in any creative development of the Code's general principles.4 '
The Exigetical School's popularity in the nineteenth century was largely
attributable to the prevailing ideology about judging. Judges had developed a
bad reputation in pre-Revolutionary France. The law courts of the Old Regime
(the Parlements)were aristocratic bodies; the judges had purchased their offices,
which remained in the same family for generations. Having actively defended
the privileges of the nobility and clergy, the judges were among the first victims

42. Jean-Marie Portalis, Discourspriliminaire, in IPierre-Antoine Fenet, Recueil complet des
travaux preparatoires du Code Civile 463, 470 (1827). Fenet reproduces in fifteen volumes the
legislative history of the Civil Code. For a modem edition of Portalis' introduction, see Frangois
Ewald, ed., Naissance du Code civil. La Raison du Igislateur 35,42 (1989) (one volume work with
selections from Code's legislative history). For a discussion of Portalis' role in drafting the Code
and a translation of the most significant passages from his introduction, see Andre Tunc,
Methodology ofthe Cvil Law in France, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 459, 467-71 (1976).
43. 1Fenet, supra note 42, at 476; Ewald, supra note 42, at 47.
44. I Fenet, supra note 42, at 469; Ewald, supra note 42, at 41.
45. 1 Fenet, supra note 42, at 476; Ewald, supra note 42, at 48. Portalis' conclusion reads
better in the original French: "Les codes des peuples se font avec le temps; mais, Aproprement
parler, on ne les fait pas." (emphasis in original).
46. See Julien Bonnecase, L'tcole de P'extgse en droit civil 126-81 (2d ed. 1924) and Eugene
Gaudemet, L'interprdtation du Code civil en France depuis 1804, at 18-56 (1935). For further
discussion in English, see Edward A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France for the Act of Things: A
Study InJudicial Lawmaking, 48 La. L. Rev. 1299, 1305-10 (1988).
47. Halptrin, supra note 14, at 56-59.
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of the Revolution when the Constituent Assembly abolished the Parlementsin
1790. The victors in the revolutionary struggle wanted no return of the Old
Regime, and one impetus behind the codification movement was a desire to
restrain the judges. A comprehensive Code, so the argument went, would be
judge-proof. Judges could no longer make law, but would mechanically apply
Code texts. No doubt Portalis and the Code's three other drafters (all distinguished jurists under the Old Regime) did not share this vision and recognized
its impracticability, but their view was a minority one at the time. The
prevailing ideology denied any creative role to judges and emphasized the
completeness of the Code." Those premises were consistent with the Exigetical
School's assumption that the judge was not making law but merely applying
statutory texts.
The last two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a turning point in
the interpretation of the Code.49 The principal change was the appearance of
a fourth method of interpretation that sought to discern the function or purpose
of the text to be interpreted.5" Prior to this development, the Exigetical School
had recognized three methods of interpretation: the linguistic method, which
focused on the text itself; the grammatical method, which utilized analogies and
various maxims; and the historical method, which looked to either the legislative
history of the Code or to the Roman or customary basis for the provision subject
to interpretation. All three methods sought to ascertain the legislature's actual
intent. Under the purposive approach, on the other hand, the interpreter ascribes
to a Code text an objective purpose that does not depend on the actual intent of
the lawmakers.5 '
This new method of interpretation proved useful to scholars and judges who
wished to adapt aged statutory provisions to modern conditions.' 2 In this
respect it bears a striking resemblance to the Legal Process School in this
country.53 Some French jurists, however, took purposive interpretation one step
further to embrace G6ny's "free scientific research."' For these jurists, to
accomplish the needed updating, the interpreter must consider contemporary
social needs in formulating a text's purpose. As explained by Ballot-Beaupr6,
the chief judge of the Court of Cassation, in an oft-quoted speech delivered on
the occasion of the Code's centenary in 1904, the courts-as long as they do not

48.
adopted
enacted
49.

50.

See Wells, supra note 39. Professor Wells argues that the austere syllogistic opinion form
by the French courts reflected an effort to deflect any suggestion ofjudicial departures from
texts; i.e., to conceal judicial lawmaking. Id. at 104-06.
Halpdrin, supra note 14, at 171.

On these four methods of interpretation, see Alfred Rieg, Rapport Franfals sur le droit

civil, inXXIX Travaux de I'Association Henri Capitant, L'interprttation par lejuge des rtgles dcrites
70-85 (1978). See also David, supra note 10, at 155-69.
51. Troper et al., supra note 16, at 181-82.
52. Id. at 183.
53. See Eskridge, supra note 37, at 26-28, 143-46 (Legal Process School engages in dynamic
statutory interpretation by attributing purposes to statutes.).

54.

See supra text accompanying note 15.
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violate the letter of the Code-should interpret its broad provisions "generously
and humanly so as to adapt the text to the realities and needs of modem life."'"
Ballot-Beaupre's ideal judge strikingly resembles Ronald Dworkin's well-known
Hercules; both strive mightily to extract from the text the best possible result."6
Portalis surely would have been pleased with Ballot-Beaupr6's remarks, as
was Frangois G~ny.57 Not only did purposive interpretation appear consistent
with their understanding of the courts' responsibility for completing the Civil
Code, but it also contributed mightily to the preservation of Portalis' work
product. Recodification had become a very live issue in France at the turn of the
century. The Radical Republicans who governed the country viewed the
industrialized, bourgeois society of "la belle Epoque"as quite different from the
more authoritarian and rural society ofNapoleon's Empire. Did not France-like
Germany-need a new Code to accommodate those changes? The recodification
movement nevertheless petered out shortly after the Code's centenary in 1904.
A factor contributing to its failure was the greater willingness of the judges to
innovate by proposing judge-made solutions for contemporary problems."8 The
Republicans learned to love the Code (or at least live with it) when they realized
it could be updated by interpretation."
II. EBB

AND

FLOW OF

ARTICLES' INTERPRETATION

A. Benign Neglect Prior to the 1970s
All three Code provisions which are the subject of this article enjoyed a
comparatively peaceful existence until the 1970s. This inattention is particularly
surprising for Article 1134(3), the general clause requiring good faith in contract
performance. A similar provision in the German Civil Code (Article 242)

55. 1Giny, supra note 14, n* 190, at 250 n.2 (quoting Baliot-Beaupr6 in epilogue to second
edition). Professor David also quotes, in his standard work on French law, Ballot-Beaupre's speech.
David, supra note 10, at 163-64.
Gny's and Ballot-Beaupre's position is nevertheless consistent with a strongly intentionalist
approach to the Code. As emphasized by Professor Wieacker, the drafters of the Code Civil and
other eighteenth and nineteenth century Civil Codes came from the legal elites immersed in the
prevailing private law culture. Wieacker, supra note 12, at 258, 443. Surely the drafters did not
expect that codification would terminate the development of concepts that had been pondered,
debated, and refined by jurists for nearly two thousand years. See infra text accompanying note 199.
On strong intentionalism, and the rejection of hermeneutics (the reader's ascribing meaning to a
text), see Paul Campos, That Obscure Object ofDesire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous Legal
Text, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1065 (1993).
56. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 313 (1986) ("best answer to political questions").
57. Gdny found in Ballot-Beaupre's remarks ameans to reconcile "unshakeable respect for the
law (lo) with a sincere desire forprogress." I Gtny, supra note 14, n* 190, at 250.
58. Halpdrin, supra note 14, at 180-81. The legislature also relieved the pressure for
recodification by enacting several major pieces of reform legislation outside of the Code; e.g., the
Workers' Compensation Law of 1898. Id.
59. Halp rin, supra note 14, at 174.
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became the basis, starting in the early 1920s, for a mammoth effort by the
German courts to achieve fairness by rewriting contracts unbalanced by inflation
or other unforeseen circumstances." ° According to the German courts'
interpretation of that article, a debtor could not in good faith discharge a debt
with currency that had become worthless. Several eminent French jurists have
invoked Article 1134(3) to argue that French courts should adopt a similar
approach to contracts disrupted by war or other unforseeable circumstances,",
but the courts have steadfastly refused to recognize unforeseen circumstances
(imprdvision) as a grounds for discharging or revising contracts. In fact, until
recently they very rarely applied Article 1134(3) at all, and most of the older
cases invoked by modem treatise writers as examples of bad faith performance
do not cite Article 1134(3) as the basis for the decision. 3 As one treatise
writer has described the situation, Article 1134(3) enjoyed a long sleep."
There are at least two explanations for this neglect. First, the Exigetical
School, dominant throughout the nineteenth century, interpreted Article 1134(3)
to do no more than to abolish the Roman law distinction between contracts
requiring good faith by the parties and contracts requiring only literal performance."3 For the latter contracts, Roman law rarely allowed an aggrieved party
to plead fraud or duress." Quite plainly, Article 1134's drafters intended to
change that rule. The Exigetical School, uninterested in updating the Code, was
happy to leave matters there, as were the courts. Henceforth, all contracts
required good faith.
Second, the Republican activists, who came into prominence at the Code's
centenary, found in the notion of "abuse of right" a ready substitute which made
unnecessary any reference to bad faith performance. Fashioned by leading

60. See Dawson, supra note 11, at 468-79.
61. See. e.g., VI Marcel Planiol &Georges Ripert, Traiti pratique de droit civil franvais n*396,
at 553-55 (1930).
62. The lead decision is Cass. civ., March 6, 1876, D. 1876, 1,193, note Antoine Giboulot
(commonly cited as the Canal de Craponne case). In that case, the court enforced a price term in
a water supply contract formed in 1567 even though the price for the water had become derisively
low. For modem commentary on Canal de Craponne, see Franqois Terr6 & Yves Leguette, Les
grands arrets de Iajurisprudence civile 406-13 (10th ed. 1994). That well-known work reproduces

the Court of Cassation's leading private law cases with accompanying commentary.
63. For discussion of good faith performance in the modem treatises, see Terrd, Les obligations,
supra note 5, nn' 414-430, at 347-62 and Philippe Malaurie and Laurent Aynbs, Droit civil. Leas
obligations n*622, at 350-51 (7th ed. 1997). The leading monograph on good faith performance
similarly minimizes the importance of the early case law. Alain Bdnabent, La bonne foi dans
l'exdcution du contral, in XLIII Travaux de 'Association Henri Capitant, La bonne foi 291 (1992).
For older decisions cited as examples of bad faith performance, but which do not explicitly invoke
Article 1134(3), see Cass. req., March 23, 1909, S.1909, 1,552 (owner, like the owner in Jacob &
Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921), sought awasteful cost-of-completion recovery) and Cass.
civ., Nov. 28, 1905, D.P. 1909, 1, 193, S. 1909, 1,269 (carrier chose longer route for shipment).
64. Boris Starck et al., Droit civil. Obligations: Contrat n° 1142, at 466 (3d ed. 1988).
65. VI Planiol & Ripert, supra note 61, n° 379, at 524.
66. Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law 163-64 (1962).
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progressive jurists at the beginning of this century, the theory of abuse of right
recognized that the holder of a right could be liable for its abuse.67 A paradigmatic abuse of right, as at common law, was a property owner's erection of a
spite fence. Although the theory lacked a firm textual basis, its proponents
expected that it would provide the courts with a means to alleviate the injustices
often produced by the highly individualistic, everyone-protect-themselves
philosophy which the Exigetical School found in the Code. Thus, they
applauded when the Court of Cassation found an abuse of right by an employer
who fired an at-will employee, whose performance was satisfactory, after leading
the employee to believe he had job security. 6' According to Louis Josserand,
the theory's most vigorous advocate, rights (like Code sections) had their own
purpose or finality; they were not absolute but had to be exercised for some
legitimate motive consistent with that purpose.69 Thus, courts could review an
employer's exercise of a contract right to terminate an at-will employee to
determine if there was an objective basis for the employer's actions.
The theory of abuse of rights provoked a lively doctrinal debate in the early
70
decades of this century, but the results obtained in the courts were meager.
This was largely attributable to Georges Ripert, a noted conservative jurist, who
defused the overtly political (social justice) aspects of the theory by arguing that
there was an abuse of rights only if the rights holder had the subjective intent to
injure.7
Professor Ripert's approach received the Court of Cassation's
endorsement in 1971 when the Court found no abuse of rights, because there was
no intent to injure, in a lessor's refusal, "inspired by self-interest and maintained
through stubbornness," to consent to a lessee's installation of a new baking
oven.7 That decision severely restricted the scope of the theory and presaged
poorly for any flowering of the companion doctrine of good faith performance.
Unlike Article 1134(3), Article 1591 on certainty of price was most
definitely not asleep prior to the 1970s, but its application did not raise serious
difficulties. This fact is surprising, given the specificity of the rule found in that

67. For a thorough discussion of the theory, see Jacques Ghestin et al., Traitt de droit civil.
Introduction g~ntrale nn- 761-805, at 747-92 (4th ed. 1994).
68. See Cass. civ., August 1, 1900, S. 1901,1,219, note Albert Wahl; Cass civ., May 18, 1909
and July 7, 1909, S. 1909, 1, 428, unsigned note. In one of the 1909 cases the employee had relied
on the employer's assurances by relocating; in the other two cases there was no evidence of
detrimental reliance.
69. Louis Josserand, De I'abus des droits (1905). (The application of Josserand's argument
found in the following sentence is my own.)
70. Antoine Pirovano, La fonction sociale des droits: Rdflections sur le destin des th6ories de
Josserand, D. 1972, Chr. 67.
71. Georges Ripert, La rfgle morale dans les obligations civiles nn- 90-95, at 159-68 (4th ed.
1949). For Ripert's.consrvatism and service as a minister for the Vichy government, see Halptrin,.
supra note 14, at 190-91.
72. Cass. 3e civ., Oct. 12, 1971, D. 1972, Jur. 210, J.C.P. 1972, II, 16966, unsigned note.

American courts have in recent years invoked good faith as a basis for requiring the lessor to have
a legitimate reason for withholding consent. Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735 (Md. 1990).
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article. As observed by Barry Nicholas, the Roman rule on certainty of price has
remained strongest in legal systems which assumed their modem shape longest
ago.73 Thus, in f 804 the French Civil Code adopted a particularly rigid version
of the Roman rule; the text of Article 1591 requires the price tobe "fixed and
stated by the parties," while Roman law only required that it be ascertainable at
the time of contract formation. Nearly a century later in 1896, the German Civil
Code adopted a more flexible approach allowing a party to set the price if done
equitably."'
This evolution demonstrates that the Roman rule, while not unreasonable for
the relatively simple commercial framework of the ancient world, does not meet
the needs of modem commerce." As described by a leading French treatise,
it is a rule designed for petty shopkeepers who do not plan for the long term."
Today, however, commercial sales contracts are normally executory and often
involve numerous performances over a protracted period of time. To expect the
parties at contract formation to "fix and state" the price is unrealistic because
most buyers and sellers want to establish a secure relationship and not to gamble
on the futures market. Lawmakers in other countries have responded to these
concerns, 77 while France, at least until 1995, preserved its splendid isolation by
insisting on certainty of price as an essential element of a sales contract.s
Judicial flexibility in interpreting Article 1591 explains why that article did
not cause significant problems prior to the 1970s. The courts did not interpret
Article 1591 to require the parties at contract formation to set the price in
numerical terms, as the statutory words "fixed and stated" seemingly demanded.
Rather, as the Court of Cassation announced in a leading case on certainty of
price, it was sufficient that the price was "determinable" by reference to factors
that did not depend on the will of either of the parties. Therefore, a price term
satisfied Article 1591 if it required the buyer to pay the debt (readily ascertainable) of a named entity. 79 That interpretation found support in Article 1592 of

73. Barry Nicholas, Certainty of Price,in Essays in Honor of John Henry Merryman on His
Seventieth Birthday 247, 250 (David S. Clark ed., 1990).
74. Id. at 250. If a party sets a price unfairly, the other party may ask the court to set the price.
Id. at 251. In 1942, Italy largely adopted the German approach in its revised Civil Code. Id. at 252.
75. Id. at 251. By the late nineteenth century, common law courts enforced sales contracts
which said nothing about price; in these cases, the buyer was obligated to pay a reasonable price.
See William L. Prosser, Open Price In Contractsfor the Sale ofGoods, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 733, 740
(1932).
76. Philippe Malaurie & Laurent Ayn6s, Droit Civil. Les contrats spiciaux n° 203, at 144 (4th
ed. 1990).
77. See Nicholas, supra note 73, at 250-55; U.C.C. § 2-305(2) (1977).
78. All modem commentators have emphasized France's isolation. Two recent comparative
studies support that conclusion: Denis Tallon, La d6termination du prix dans lea contrats (6tude de
droit compare) (1988) and Isabelle Corbisier, La ddtermination du prix dans lea contrats
commerciaux portant vente de marchandises, 40 Rev. Int'l Dr. Com. (Revue interationale de droit
compare) 767 (1988).
79. Cass. req., Jan. 7, 1925, D.H. 1925, 57 (reproduced with accompanying commentary in
Terr and Leguette, supra note 62, at 707-13).
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the Code, which recognized that the parties could leave the determination of the
price to a third person. A purposive interpretation of Article 1592 supports
upholding a wide range of price terms tying the price to some objective index
not controlled by either of the parties. It also supports enforcing a sale at the
market price on some designated date in the future, a result reached by several
decisions in the 1930s.80 Is not the market price merely the price determined
by a large number of third persons?
Courts balked, however, when the price term appeared to require some
further agreement by the parties, as in a sale for "what it is worth" or for a "fair
price.""S Those price terms remained unenforceable under the Court's interpretation, as did a price term allowing either party to set the price. In both cases,
the determination of the price required some further manifestation of intent by
one or both of the parties. Finally, courts were unwilling to provide a remedy
if the index or other pricing mechanism selected by the parties failed for some
reason. Substituting some new mechanism required a rewriting of the contract,
something the courts believed they could not do. After all, did not Article 1592
explicitly state that there is no sale if the third person selected by the parties is
unable or unwilling to fix the price? 2
Article 1129(1), the third Code provision addressed in this study, also played
a relatively uneventful role until the 1970s, but the relationship of that article
with the more specific Article 1591 remained an unsettled question. The latter
article applies only to sales contracts (for both real and personal property), while
Article 1129(1) applies to all contracts; i.e., it forms part of what the French call
the general or "common law" of contracts. This "common law" of contracts
represents the Code's principal advance over the Roman law of contracts. While
the formalistic and procedurally-based Roman law recognized only a discrete
number of specific contracts for which the law provided a remedy,83 the Civil
Code allows the parties to fashion whatever contracts they choose. According
to Article 1134(1), contracts "lawfully formed" have the effect of law between
the parties.6 4 For a contract to be valid, Article 1108 of the Code requires just
four elements: consent, capacity, a definite subject matter (objet), and a licit

80. Cass. req., Feb. 5, 1934, 1934 Gaz. Pal., 2, 331; Cass. com., Feb. 17, 1931, D.P. 1931, 1,
41, note Pierre Voirin.
81. X Planiol & Ripert, supra note 61, no 36, at 30.
82. The pre-UCC common law of sales did not differ much from the pre-1970s French law
described above. Courts enforced areasonable price if the parties said nothing on price, but did not
enforce agreements which agreed to allow one party to set the price. Similarly, if a designated third
person price-setter did not do what was expected, the contract failed. See Prosser, supra note 75,
at 734-36. Professor Prosser, the future torts scholar, questioned the courts' distinction between cases
where the parties said nothing on price and cases where the parties provided amechanism for setting
the price. Why should the courts refuse to imply an agreement to do what isreasonable in the latter
situation when they were willing to do so in the former? Id. at 736 n.7. The Uniform Commercial
Code ultimately adopted Prosser's position. U.C.C. § 2-305 discussed in supra note 8.
83. Nicholas, supra note 66, at 159-67.
84. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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cause. Alongside this general or common law of contract, the Code preserves
the principal special contracts found in Roman law. For those special or named
contracts, Article 1107 of the Code tells us that the Code contains "special rules"
in addition to the "general rules" applicable to all contracts. Article 1591 on
certainty of price is one of those special rules applicable to sales contracts. A
similar special rule applicable to service and construction contracts appears in
Article 1710 which defines the essential elements of those contracts in terms of
one party agreeing to do something for another party for "an agreed price. 9 5
The Code's recognition of the parties' ability to fashion their own contracts,
rather than restricting them to a list of pre-approved contracts, is often
attributable to the "will" theory of contract. According to this theory, it is the
intent of the parties which gives contracts their legal force. The judge is merely
the servant of the parties, a "ministre de la volonti des parties," charged with
enforcing their common intent.' 6 This theory gained wide acceptance in the
nineteenth century; it still predominates in France where agreement provides the
basis for contract (reliance receiving no independent protection) 7 and where
unconscionability has gained no general entry into the Code."
Modem scholars, both French and American, have questioned whether the
Code's drafters-heavily imbued with natural law notions of justice and
fairness-shared this highly individualistic vision of independent actors making
their own private law.8 9 More importantly, contemporary doctrinal writers have
seen in the general framework which the Code imposes on contracting
parties--often called the "ossature"or bone structure on which the parties must

85. Service and construction contracts comprise a single special contract, designated by the
Code as a louage d'ouvrage, but called today a contrat d'enterprise. The contrat d'enterprise has
become, after the sales contract, the most commonly used special contract. Jdr6me Huet, Trait6 de
droit civil. Les principaux contrats spiciaux n*32002, at 1107-08 (1996). French law distinguishes
the contrat d'enterprise from employment contracts (now covered by a separate Labor Code) and
from agency contracts (mandat), where the agent represents (and can bind) the principal.
86. Terre, Les obligations, supra note 5,n* 24, at 25.
87. In France, all contracts are bilateral in that they require the assent of both parties.
However, a contract need not impose performance obligations on both parties. Thus, if A promises
to make a gift to B and B assents, there is an enforceable contract (called a unilateral contract in
France). See C.Civ. art. 1103 (Dalloz 1996-97). If B does not assent, A cannot be liable in contract
even if B detrimentally relies. This example demonstrates both that consideration is not necessary
to enforce apromise and that reliance does not provide a basis for doing so. Of course, other Code
articles may protect reliance interests; e.g., Article 1382's fault principle has been used to compensate
a party for losses attributable to the other party's fault in contract negotiations.
88. In three specific situations, the Code provides arescissionary remedy for ldsion; i.e., agross
disproportion between the performances required of the parties. See Nicholas, supra note 5,at 138.
The most significant provision covers land sales and protects only the seller. C. Civ. art. 1674
(Dalloz 1996-97). The Code explicitly provides that Islon does not invalidate contracts in other
situations. Id. at art. I18.
89. Georges Rouhette, The Obligatory Force of Contract in French Law, in Contract Law
Today: Anglo-French Comparisons 38 (Donald Harris & Denis Tallon eds., 1989) [hereinafter
Anglo-French Comparisons]; James R. Gordley, French Ovil Code Myths, 42 Am. J.Comp. L. 459
(1994).
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build their contract-the means for courts to assure that the particular interests
of the contracting parties are equitably reconciled and the general interests
adequately safeguarded." For these writers, the most prominent features in the
Code's framework are the requirements that a contract have a definite subject
matter (objet) and a licit cause.' These general provisions allow courts to
introduce external norms into the world of contract, thus tempering the private
parties' lawmaking powers. 2 Not surprisingly, given the demise of the rugged
individualism associated with nineteenth-century liberalism, late twentiethcentury judges have proved more willing to do so than their nineteenth-century
counterparts. In intervening in the formerly more private world of contract, the
judges have no doubt been encouraged by the legislature's example.9"
Article 1129(1) performed this framework function prior to the 1970s. For
example, if, unbeknownst to the parties, the subject matter of a contract did not
exist at contract formation, or a party's performance was impossible, the courts
treated the contract as null.94 Similarly, certain subject matters (e.g., the human
body) could not become the objet of a contractual obligation." On the other
hand, Article 1129's role was quite modest in assuring the definiteness of a
contract's subject matter. Two reasons explain this limited role. First, there was
the apparent relationship between Article 1591 on certainty of price and Article
1129. Was not the former a more demanding special rule applicable only to
sales contracts? One would not expect the general rule applicable to all contracts
to be as demanding.96 In addition, the wording of the two articles supported
this approach. Article 1591 requires the parties to "fix and state" the price, while
Article 1129 only requires that the contract specify the "kind" of performance
due; with respect to the amount or quantity of the performance, it is sufficient
that it is somehow "determinable." 9 ' The case law developed these distinctions.
For certain special contracts (e.g., agency contracts) and for service and
construction contracts, the courts explicitly recognized that the parties could leave
open the price term. If the parties were subsequently unable to agree on a price,
90.
91.

Tcn6, Les obligations, supra note 5,n* 28, at 26-27.
Id. Cause is the end pursued by a contracting party. Nicholas, supra note 5, at 118. It

must be licit, but adonative intent isa proper cause. Thus, an agreement to make agift has alicit
cause and isenforceable.
92. Courts have also utilized Article 6 of the French Civil Code, which explicitly provides that
"agreements cannot deviate from those rules of law that embody principles of public policy or good
morals." C. Civ. art. 6 (Dalloz 1996-97).

93.

Two of the most well-known legislative interventions are the legislature's authorizing the

courts to grant payment delays to hard-pressed debtors (see C.Civ. arts. 1244 to 1244-3, as amended
in 1936 and subsequent years) and to modify penalty clauses (see C. Civ. art. 1153, as amended in
1975).
94. VI Planiol and Ripert, supra note 61, n° 220, at 294-95.
95. Terrt, Les obligations, supra note 5,nn' 266-71, at 222-26. Article 1128 also supports

that result.
96. Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, L'nddtermtnation du prix, 91 Rev. Tri. Dr. Civ. (Revue
trimestrielle de droit civil) 269, 274 (1992) (describing pre-1970s assumption).
97. For the text of Articles 1129 and 1591, see supra notes 3 and 4.
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the courts would determine a reasonable price for them." Certainty of price
thus became a special rule applicable only to sales contracts.
The second* explanation for Article 1129's limited role in requiring
definiteness derives from the willingness of the Code's drafters to write a
contract for the parties. In other words, many Code articles (especially those
applicable to special contracts) are suppletive in nature; i.e., they serve as gap
fillers if the parties do not explicitly override them by agreement." This Code
feature makes contract drafting relatively straightforward, if not easy, in France.
The Code itself says nothing about offer and acceptance or the mechanics of
contract formation, but the case law is clear that contract formation occurs when
the parties agree on the essential terms, unless the party who denies there is a,
contract establishes that the parties did not intend to be bound until there was
agreement on a nonessential term.'
For example, for a sales contract, the
essential terms-the only terms on which the parties must agree for there to be
a contract-are the thing sold and the price.'0 ' For other contracts, there is
more uncertainty but surprisingly little litigation over what terms are essential.
In practice, if the parties intend to be bound (a factual matter left entirely to the
trial judges), the courts seem quite willing to fill any gaps in their agreement
with suppletive terms derived from the Code, common usage, or good morals.' 3 Indeed, the traditional French approach resembles in a number of ways
that of the Uniform Commercial Code. Code provisions are largely suppletive
(i.e., they apply unless the parties otherwise agree), and a contract does not fail
for indefiniteness if the parties intend to be bound and there is a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." 3

98. Huet, supra note 85, n* 31256, at 1059-60 (agency contracts or mandat) and nn* 32191,
at I184-86 (service and construction contracts, or contrats denterprise). For agency contracts, the
courts also revise unreasonable price terms. Id. n*31257, at 1060-61, Cass. civ., Jan. 29, 1867, D.P.
1867, 1, 53, S. 1867. 1, 245 (reprinted with accompanying commentary in Tent and Leguette, supra
note 62, at 783-861). For service and construction contracts, commentators justified these special
rules-which seemed to ignore the word "price" found in Article 1710 (see supra text at note
85)-by invoking the difficulty of determining the price before performance of the work and the
practice of tradespeople billing clients for services performed. Huet, supra note 85, nn- 32191-92,
at 1184-85. For agency contracts, the commentators also invoked the traditionally gratuitous nature
of the contract and a desire to protect clients from agents who were professionals. Terrd and
Leguette, supra note 62, at 785-86.
99. Rend David has emphasized this feature of the Code and suggested that statute drafters in
common law jurisdictions might follow the Code's example. David, supra note 10, at 83-92. The
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code, perhaps influenced by Continental Codes, included many
suppletive provisions in the Code. These provisions apply unless the parties otherwise agree. See,
e.g., U.C.C. § 2-308 (1997) (delivery terms).
100. The lead case is Cass. req., Dec. 1, 1885, S. 1887, 1, 167 (reproduced with accompanying
commentary in Terr6 & Leguette, supra note 62, at 345-49).
101. Id.
102. See the casenote by Professor Joanna Schmidt to Cass. 3e civ., Jan. 14, 1987, D. 1988,,Jur.
80.
103. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1997).
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B. Revival ofArticle 1591 in the 1970s
The relative calm surrounding Article 1591 abruptly ended on April 27,
1971 when the Court ofCassation decided nineteen companion cases colloquially
referred to as the Pompistes de marque decisions."t 4 These cases pitted the
leading international oil companies against their dealers; i.e., the "pompistes de
marque" who operated service stations selling gasoline under a company's

trademark. In these cases, the Court nullified, for uncertainty of price under
Article 1591, the standard long-term distribution contract utilized by the oil
companies. That contract bound dealers to supply themselves with gasoline from
a single company; in return for such exclusivity, the company provided its
dealers with loans of materials and/or money and refrained from establishing
competing dealers within agreed territorial limits.' 5
The distribution contracts before the Court contained no express term

governing the price which the dealer would pay for the company's gasoline
because at the time of contract formation the government regulated both the
wholesale and retail price of gasoline.' t° That mechanism for determining the

price failed in 1966 when the government modified its regulation to control only
the pump price. When the oil companies responded by determining the
wholesale price, numerous dealers sought to escape their contracts, claiming that

the contracts were sales contracts and seeking judicial nullification for uncertainty
of price. The Court of Cassation obliged them in the nineteen decisions rendered
on April 17, 1971.
The Pompistes de marque decisions initiated what one critic has called a
judicial hunt for contracts to nullify for uncertainty of price.'0 7 For nearly

104. Cass. com., April 27, 1971, D. 1972, Jur. 353, note Jacques Gestin, J.C.P. 1972, 1, 16975,
note Jacques Bart.
105. The Code does not recognize the distribution contract (control de concession) as a special
contract. Rather, it is one of many "named" contracts developed by practitioners exercising the
parties' right under the Code to fashion their own contracts. See supra text accompanying notes 8384. Thus, it is subject only to the general provisions of the Code, unless the courts chose to
categorize it as one of the recognized special contracts; e.g., a sales contract.
European Community competition law now regulates distribution networks. For a discussion of
the applicable Commission regulations, see Stephen Weatherill & Paul Beaumont, EC Law 635-38
(1993) and Frangois Collart Dutilleul & Philippe Declebecque, Contrats civils et commerciaux nn*
934-49, at 688-702 (1992). A leading French commentator has expressed "astonishment" that an
anonymous bureaucracy in Brussels, under the pretext of protecting competition within the
Community. has been able to regulate acategory of contracts which the national Parliament has left
unregulated, despite pressure to intervene. Alain Sayag, The Distribution of Cars, in Anglo-French
Comparisons, supra note 89, at 336. The Commission regulations do not affect the price term of
distribution contracts but restrict the territorial protection the supplier may provide the dealer (parallel
imports must not be cut ofM)
and guarantee the dealer a minimum contract term.
106. The trial courts had found that the parties intended that the oil companies would charge the
dealers as much as the government regulation allowed.
107. See the casenote by Philippe Malaurie in Cas. le civ., June 28, 1988, D. 1989, Jur. 121,
122.
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twenty-five years, until the full Court ofCassation intervened to halt the venture
on December 1, 1995, the courts nullified long-term distribution contracts, as
well as analogous franchise and supply contracts,' that did not contain a
"serious, precise, and objective" price term applicable to purchases made by the
dealer or franchisee under the contract."' This adventure in judicial lawmaking produced an abundance of litigation"o and an avalanche of scholarly criticism." According to the critics, the Court's case law imposed an unrealistic
demand on the contracting parties. Long-term contractual arrangements for
distributing goods are necessarily incomplete, especially with respect to the price
the distributer must pay; using a third person price-setter is normally too timeconsuming, while tying price to some objective index is often too risky. In
practice, suppliers usually complete the agreement by themselves, setting the
price at the time of delivery. Given these economic realities, it is unsurprising
that the Court's new case law did not much change commercial practice.
Distribution contracts with open price terms, or price terms referring to the

108. Both French law and European Community law distinguish between distribution and
franchise contracts. The distinctive feature of a franchise contract is the franchisee's acquisition of
know-how or of industrial or intellectual property; unlike a dealer under a distribution contract, the
franchisee does not necessarily resell goods purchased under the contract. Under French law, both
distribution and franchise contracts afford the dealer or franchisee some territorial protection against
competition. On the other hand, ifa supplier does not restrict itself from dealing with other persons
within an agreed territory, the contract binding a retail outlet to that supplier is not a distribution or
franchise contract, but rather an exclusive supply contract. For these distinctions, see Dutilleul and
Delebecque, supra note 105, at nn' 924-33, 936, at 678-87, 689-90. Community law regulates both
exclusive supply and franchise contracts in the same fashion it does distribution contracts. See the
authorities cited supra in note 105.
French law does not treat any of these contracts as requirements contracts; i.e., the party in the
dealer's position, unless obligated to purchase aquota from the supplier, is only obligated to refrain
from purchasing from other suppliers. Requirements contracts are largely unknown in France
because the buyer's obligation to buy isnull as subject to a potestative condition. Nicholas, supra
note 5, at 168.
109. This standard for certainty of price, formulated subsequent to the Pompistes de marque
decisions, appears in a great many of the Court of Cassation's opinions from the late 1970s and
1980s. See Tallon, supra note 78, at 64 and Guillaume Tell decision Infra at note 122. Under this
formulation, the sales price need only be determinable, but its determination cannot depend on
subjective factors such as the parties subsequently agreeing on the price or on one party setting the
price.
110. Comparativists have noted the high rate of comnmercial litigation in France. This
phenomenon is attributable, at least in part, to the low cost of litigating and to the litigants' ready
access, at the trial level at least, to commercial courts composed of nonlawyers. See Donald Harris
& Denis Tallon, Conclusions, In Anglo-French Comparisons, supra note 89, at 392-93.
Ill. Three articles appearing shortly before the full Court ended the hunt for nulliies summarize
well the difficulties caused by the Court's approach. See Louis Vogel, Plaidoyerpourun revirement:
contre I'obligationde ddtermination du prix dans lescontrats de distribution, D. 1995, Chr. 155
[hereinafter Vogel, Plaidoyer]; Laurent Aynes, Inditermination du prix dons lescontrats de
distribution: comment sortir de l'impasse?, D. 1993, Chr. 25 [hereinafter Aynes, Indetermination
du prix]; and Didier Ferrier; La ditermination du prix dans les contrats stipulant une obligation
d'approvisionnementexclusyff D. 1991, Chr. 237 [hereinafter Ferrier, La d6termination].
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supplier's catalogue price, remained prevalent despite their invalidity under the
Pompistes de marquecases."' This situation produced injustices when a dealer
invoked the contract's nullity, not because the dealer was unhappy with the
supplier's price, but because the dealer wished to avoid damages for its own
breach or to escape, often subsequent to the relationship's termination, a
noncompetition or other accessory clause.
At first glance, the unfortunate result in the Pompistes de marque cases
appears attributable to the Code's obsolete article on certainty of price. No
doubt the Pompistes de marque facts reflect an aspect of modem life not
foreseen by the drafters of the 1804 Code: the mass production and distribution
of consumer goods. To market their goods, suppliers of gasoline, automobiles,
appliances, and (more recently) fast foods have developed networks of dealers
for selling their products to the consuming public. By the late 1960s, the
distribution mechanisms in place in France resembled those found elsewhere in
the industrialized world.' Suppliers (usually the manufacturer) chose to sell
their products through recognized distributors, bound to the supplier through
long-term contractual arrangements, rather than through their own employees
(vertical integration) or through independent retail outlets."1 4 To accomplish
this goal, suppliers and their lawyers developed standardized contracts which the
suppliers imposed on their dealers."' As was the case with the major oil
companies, the supplier usually provided some monetary or material assistance
and territorial protection to the dealer; in return, the supplier expected the dealer
to refrain from handling the goods of other suppliers. The distribution contracts
which resulted did not appear to match any ofthe special contracts provided for
in the Code, but were examples of the parties (or at least the dominant party)
fashioning their own contracts to meet commercial needs.

112. Ayns, Indetermination du prix, supra note I11. at 25 (contracting practices unaffected by
Court's caselaw) and Vogel, Plaidoyer, supra note I 11, at 155 (impossible to impose on practice a
rule which the latter does not respect).
113. On world-wide similarities in distribution methods, see Vogel, Plaidoyer, supra note ill,
at 155-56. See also Donald Harris & Denis Talon, Conclusions, The Distribution of Cars: A
Complex Contractual Technique, in Anglo-French Comparisons, supra note 89, at 370-71 (study of
English and French distribution contracts reveals contract terms not very different).
This phenomenon appears to have arrived later in France than in other Western countries, a delay
perhaps attributable to the hard times and devastation caused by two World Wars. Prior to the
Pompistes de marque cases, the only distribution or similar contracts prompting significant litigation
were those binding brasseries to the major brewers of beer. See Cass. req., Feb. 5, 1934, Gaz. Pal.
1934, 2, 331 (discussed infra note 119).
114. For a description of the contractual arrangements that had become prevalent by the 1960s,
see Rent Rodiare & Claude Champaud, A propos des "pompstes de marque ": Les contrats de
distribution integre et la marge commerciale du distributeur, J.C.P. 1966, 1,1988; Paul Didier, A
propos du contrat de concession: La station service, D. 1966, Chr. 55 and J.-M. Mousseron & A.
Seube, A propos des contrats d'assistance etfourniture, D. 1973, Chr. 197.
115. On distribution contracts as contracts of adhesion, see Frangois Xavier Testu, Le juge et
ie contrat d'adhision, J.C.P. 1993, 1,3673, at 201.
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French distribution contracts, however, have one very distinctive feature.
For the French practitioner, the distribution contract is only a "framework"
contract (contrat cadre) for the "application" contracts (contratsd'application)
which follow. Thus, the dealer's purchasing of goods from the supplier is not
performance under the distribution or framework contract but the formation of
a separate contract. Distinguishing in this fashion between framework and
application contracts does not appear to affect contract drafting; the parties sign
a single document drafted by the supplier. Rather, it provides a method for
analyzing the contractual relationship between the parties-a method which the6
parties hoped would convince the courts to enforce distribution contracts.1
The contract's original proponents acknowledgedthat distribution contracts might
disconcert jurists "accustomed to traditional contract concepts derived from
Roman law," but argued that those concepts had been created for situations
"which bore no relation to the economic'realities of the modem world.""'
Those realities required "an updating of one's baggage of legal tools.""' The
framework contract provided such a mechanism.
The concern raised by distribution contracts was one of indefiniteness. The
contracts obviously contemplated that the dealer would purchase goods for resale,
but did not specify either quantity or price. How could such a contract satisfy
the Code's general rule on definiteness (Article 1129) or its special rule,
applicable to sales contracts, on certainty of price (Article 1591)? The response
proffered by the suppliers was to analyze separately the framework contract and
the application contracts. The former did not appear.to be a sales contract (there
was no transfer of property). It also appeared to be sufficiently definite; i.e., the
dealer's promise of exclusivity in return for material assistance and territorial
protection. The application contracts were most likely sales contracts, but they
became sufficiently definite when the parties agreed on the quantity and price;
i.e., when the dealer accepted the supplier's price for the order. The dealer was
likely to do so because the dealer's only alternative was to terminate the
framework contract, thus allowing the supplier to recoup some or all of its
material aid. If the supplier did not wish to rely on the dealer's acquiescence,
it could seek to assure the validity of the sales contracts by providing in the
framework contract that the dealer would pay the market price or even the
supplier's posted'price for goods subsequently ordered. Case law from the 1930s
involing distribution contracts for beer had treated those price terms as
satisfying Article 1591."'

116. Frd6ric Pollaud-Dulian & Alain Ronzano, Le contra# cadre, par delh les paradoxes, 49
Rev. Tri. Dr. Com. (Revue trimestrielle du droit commercial) 179, 180 (1996).
117. Rodibre & Champaud, supra note 114, at para. 1.
118. Id.
119. Cass. req., Feb. 5, 1934, 1934 Gaz.Pal., 2, 331; Cass. com., Feb. 17, 1931,D.P. 1931, 1,
41, note Piene Voirin. Both cases treated market price as an enforceable price term. In the 1934
case, the dealer had agreed to pay the price the brewery was charging its other clients for beer at the
time of the dealer's order. In upholding that price term under Article 1591, the Court reasoned that
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The suppliers' strategy received a major rebuff in the Pompistesde marque
decisions. In those cases the Court of Cassation made no mention of the
distinction between framework and application contracts but treated the oil
companies' distribution contracts as sales contracts which failed for uncertainty of
price. That rebuff, however, did not appear to be definitive for at least two
reasons. First, the principal basis for the decisions appeared to be that the
mechanism selected by the parties for setting the price had failed. The parties had
relied on a third person-the government-to set the price; when the government
ceased to do so, the contracts became void. The courts could not impose on the
parties a substitute price term if they failed to agree on price. Thus, the Court of
Cassation did not resolve in the Pompistesde marquedecisions the validity of
allowing the supplier to set the price." 0 Second, the Court did not explain why
distribution contracts were sales contracts. Just one year previously, the Court had
qualified a distribution contract for beer as an exclusive supply contract and iot
a sales contract.' 2' In addition, the Court's categorizing distribution contracts
as sales contracts seemed inconsistent with the parties' right to fashion their own
contracts. According to this line of reasoning, parties need not agree to a sale, but
may form an unnamed contract subject only to the Code's "general" rules.
C. Revival of Article 1129(1) in the 1970s
The definitive rebuff to distribution contracts with incomplete price terms
came six years later in 1978. Significantly, the Court of Cassation chose Article
1129(1) to administer the coup de grace, thus recognizing that distribution
contracts were not sales contracts. The occasion arose in three companion cases
involving distribution contracts between brewers and their brasseries. " ' In one
of the three cases, the Brasserie Guillaume Tell had agreed to purchase beer
exclusively from a particular brewery for a period of five years in return for
various financial advantages.'23 Unlike the distribution contracts in the
Pompistesde marque cases, the standardized contract in the Guillaume Tell case
contained an express price term. That term required the brewery to deliver beer
"at prices generally observed for goods of the same quality at the location of the
brasserie." No dispute arose over price, but the brasserie invoked the contract's
nullity for uncertainty of price when the brewery sought to enforce the contract's
penalty clause for the brasserie's violation ofthe exclusivity provision. The trial

the price was determinable because it was tied to the market and did not depend on the will of either
party. While the Court's reasoning is not crystal clear, the Court's point appeared to be that
competitive conditions prevented the brewery from arbitrarily setting the price for its clients.
120. For a forceful argument to this effect, see Jacques Ghestin, L 'inditerminailondu prlx de
vente et la condition potestative, D. 1973, Chr. 293.
121. Cass. com., Jan. 27, 1971, D. 1972, Jur. 536, note, Jacques Ghestin.122. Cass. com., Oct. 11, 1978, D. 1979, Jur. 135, note Robert Houin,J.C.P. 1979, i, 19034,
note Yvon Loussouam.
123. Cass. com., Oct. I1,1978, D. 1979, Jur. 135, 135-36.
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court (a Court of Appeals), applying Article 1591, had found the price
sufficiently determinable because the contract referred to market price. The
Court of Cassation, on the other hand, applied Article 1129(1) to quash the lower
court's judgment; the Court reasoned that the lower court had not found that the
market price at the place of delivery provided an element of reference that was
"serious, precise, and objective;"
The scholarly reaction to Guillaume Tell and its companion cases was
uniformly hostile.' 2 The commentators made three basic points. First, they
criticized the Court's interpretation of Article 1129(1) to require certainty of
-price for contracts that were not sales contracts. As later expressed by the Court
of Cassation's First Advocate General Michel JMol, "How the devil did that
article get drawn from its lethargy to become the general rule for the determination of the price in contracts of long duration?"' 25 That question is a good one.
Article 1129 requires definiteness with respect to "things" and, according to the
critics, "price" is not a thing. 2 ' With respect to price, Article 1591 states a
special rule for sales contracts; that rule may apply elsewhere by analogy, but it
cannot become the general rule for all contracts under Article 1129(1).
Second, the commentators criticized the Court's seeming rejection ofmarket
price as a valid price term. They understood the Court's formula for a valid
price term ("serious, precise, and objective") to require something more than a
reference to prices generally charged in the area or to the price charged by a
particular supplier to its clients generally. What that something was remained
unclear, but there was a general consensus that under the Court's new rule
market price was no longer sufficiently definite unless there were enough
transactions on the market to produce a quoted price. 2" However, any such
limitation on the use of market price as a price term was unnecessary because in
most industries competitive conditions prevented suppliers from arbitrarily setting
prices. Perhaps a supplier could get away with it for a while, but if one supplier
consistently charged more than did competing suppliers, the offending supplier
would not retain for long a stable network of dealers. Anticompetition laws also
protected dealers by prohibiting suppliers from price discrimination between their
customers. Thus, the Court should have treated as sufficiently "serious, precise,
and objective" those prices generally charged at the place of delivery or even the
price charged by a particular supplier generally to its clients.

124. The casenotes in Dalloz and Juris-Classeur Pdriodique were both sharply critical. See Cass.
corn., Oct. II, 1978, D. 1979, Jur. 135, note Robert Houin, J.C.P. 1979, II, 19034, note Yvon
Loussouam. See also the authorities cited in supra note I11.
125. See Jol's Conclusions toCass. ass. pl6n., Dec. 1,1995, D. 1996, Jur. 13, 13,J.C.P. 1996,
II,21, 21. For the role of the Court's advocate generals, see infra note 135.
126. The critics drew textual support from Article 1589(l) of the Code which similarly
distinguishes between "things" and "price." It reads: "The promise of a sale isthe equivalent of a
sale when there is reciprocal consent as to the thing and as to the price." (emphasis added).
Translated by Crabb, supra note I.
127. - See Frison-Roche, supra note 96, at 283.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

Third, the commentators emphasized the devastating practical consequences
of the Court's decisions. Not only did the trilogy of decisions invalidate most

long-term distribution contracts in France, but they offered the parties no ready
mechanism for curing the problem. Organized markets with price quotes often
did not exist, and the use of third persons to resolve disagreements over price
was usually too cumbersome. '"
The unfortunate result in Guillaume Tell and its companion cases could no
longer be blamed on an obsolete statutory text, given the Court's shift from
Article 1591 to Article 1129(1) as the basis for decision. Indeed, the Court's
critics believed that the real basis for the Court's new case law-both the
Pompistes de marque and Guillaume Tell decisions-was a desire to protect the
weaker party (the dealer) in a contract of adhesion. According to one commentator, the cases reflected a visceral judicial hostility to exclusive supply provisions. 1 29 The Court's concern was to protect the dealer, tied by contract to a
particular supplier, from unfair prices arbitrarily imposed by the supplier. To put
that argument in American terms, a price term in a standardized contract of
adhesion is unconscionable if it allows the dominant party (here the supplier) to
arbitrarily determine the other party's performance (here the price the dealer
must pay). To restate that argument in French terms, the Court was using
Article 1129(l)-part of the Code's general framework or "ossature"-toassure
that contracts equitably reconciled the interests of the parties. 3 '
This reasoning did not convince the Court's critics. They responded in two
ways to the Court's concern about protecting the weaker party. First, the Court
was battling a nonproblem because there was no evidence that suppliers had
abused their power to set price.' 3' Second, to the extent there was abuse,
nullifying the distribution contract was overkill. Rather than to allow dealers-including dealers in breach-to escape their contractual obligations, the
courts should sanction, when it occurs, abusive price-setting by suppliers.'
The critics might have added that the Court's approach was not easy to reconcile
with the unconscionability defense enacted by the legislature shortly before the
Guillaume Tell decision. Unlike the Court, the legislature explicitly limited the
defense to consumers or other nonprofessionals who contract with profession33
als.

128. Another possible mechanism is for the distribution contract to require the supplier to meet
a lower offer received by the dealer. For the Court of Cassation's approval of that mechanism,
subject to onerous conditions, see Cass. com., June 28, 1988, D. 1989, Jur. 121, note Philippe
Malaurie.
129. Vogel, Plaidoyer, supra note I ll, at 159 (right column).
130. See supra text accompanying note 90.
131. AynOs, lnd termination du prix, supra note Ill, at 26. As explained in the prior paragraph,
competitive conditions and competition law restrict the supplier's options.
132. Vogel, Plaidoyer, supra note I l, at 162.

133. The original Civil Code contained no general concept ofunconscionability. See supra note
88 for discussion of the related, but narrow, doctrine of lision. In 1978, the legislature authorized
a Commission to compile a list ofunconscionable terms (clauses abusives) that would be unenforce-
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The Court's opinions in the Pompistesde marque and subsequent cases do
not mention any concern about protecting the weak. Rather, they apply in
syllogistic fashion the rule on certainty of price (the price term must be "serious,
precise, and objective") which the Court had extracted first from Article 1591
and subsequently from Article 1129(1). This omission is unsurprising. French
opinion writing style leaves no place for the expression of reasons, much less of
policy considerations. Opinions of the Court of Cassation, which rarely exceed
a page and never contain more than a single sentence, deliberately conceal any
judicial lawmaking. While the opinions state and apply what the Court believes
to be the controlling rule, they never explain the basis for the rule. In other
words, there is no reasoned opinion explaining how a particular Code article or
how policy considerations support the Court's rule. 3'
The policy basis for the Pompistes de marque case law is nevertheless
reasonably clear. The Court's First Advocate General Michel J6ol was quite
candid about it in the conclusions he submitted to the full Court in the four cases
decided on December 1, 1995, which put an end to the Court's invalidating
contracts for uncertainty of price.'
He depicted the Pompistes de marque and
subsequent cases as a "calculated venture" in judicial lawmaking. According to
JMol, the Court had responded to what it perceived to be an imperative social
need; i.e., "protecting the weak against the strong." The Court's response did not
have a firm textual basis, but the Court "had not hesitated to apply the Code
beyond, and even outside of, what the legislature had intended." In a pronounced understatement, JMol recognized that the Court's work product had
generated less enthusiasm than some of its earlier, more fortunate efforts in

able. Law n°.78-23 of January 10, 1978. The Commission has never done very much, but in 1991
the Court of Cassation ruled that the courts could find unconscionable contract terms not included
on the Commission's list Cass. leciv., May 14, 1991, D. 1991, Jur. 449, note Jacques Ghestin,
J.C.P. 1991, II,21763, note GilUes Paisant (Minit Foto) (reproduced in Terr6 & Leguette, supra note
62, at 396-95).
The 1978 law on unconscionability only protects consumers or other nonprofessionals when
contracting with professionals; it does not apply to distribution contracts between dealers and their
suppliers. For the text of the 1978 law, as amended in 1995 to implement the European Uniofi
Directive on Consumer Protection, see C. consom. art. 132-1 reprinted in Dalloz Code civile
immediately following Article 1134. The present text, unlike the 1978 law, does not require an abuse
of bargaining power; it is sufficient that there is a "significant disequilibrium" between the
performance obligations of the parties.
134. See Wells, supra note 39, at 92.
135. Advocate generals form a corps of magistrates who argue before the Court ofCassation in
an amicus curiae capacity. Although technically part of the executive branch, they argue on behalf
of the public welfare, society's interest, and the correct application of the law. Advocate generals
submit their views on how to decide particular cases in the form of written conclusions. Mitchel de
S.-O. l'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse inthe French Legal System, 104 Yale
LJ. 1325, 1355-56 (1994).
Both the Dalloz and the Juris-Classeur Piriodique reports published Jeol's conclusions
immediately preceding the opinions in the four cases decided by the full Court on December 1, 1995.
D. 1996 Jur. at 13, J.C.P. II,22565, at 21.
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lawmaking. 36 He, therefore, urged the Court to shift course by protecting the
weaker party at the performance stage rather than at contract formation. As we
shall see, this new approach, adopted by the Court, protects the dealer from
abusive price-setting by the supplier, but otherwise enforces distribution contracts
allowing suppliers to determine the price.
JMol's conclusions depict a Court engaged in what Frangois G~ny would have
called "free scientific research."' 37 Rather than focusing on. grammatical or
textual considerations, the Court is seeking to formulate as objectively as possible
the best rule to meet contemporary social needs. Indeed, the conclusions of the
3
Court's advocate generals, as well as the reports of its reporting judges,' 8
reveal an unofficial discourse which contrasts sharply with the official discourse
of the Court's syllogistic opinions. 39 As exemplified by J6ol's conclusions,
the former discourse, unlike the text-based official discourse, emphasizes policy
considerations extrinsic to the Code's text. 40 Unfortunately, the unofficial
discourse is largely inaccessible even to interested scholars; each year the private
reporters publish only a handful of advocate generals' conclusions. 4' The
unofficial discourse's influence (and even its content) therefore often remain a
matter of surmise.
There is little doubt, however, that JMol correctly describes what motivated
the Court in its Pompistesde marquecase law. Additional evidence is available
in a study prepared for the Court of Cassation's official Annual Report by Judge
Joele Fossereau, who had served as the reporting judge in the four cases decided
by the full Court on December 1, 1995. In that study, she described the
Pompistesde marque decisions and their aftermath as "twenty years of case law
struggling blow by blow to restore balance to the contracting parties, all done
without a principle or general text serving as a base."'142 According to Judge

136. The one specific example ofjudicial lawmaking cited by JMol is the Court of Cassation's
creative use of Article 1384(1) to respond to the need to compensate persons injured by motor
vehicles. For that more successful -venture in judicial lawmaking, which culminated in the full
Court's well-known decision inJandheur,Ch. rdunies, Feb. 13, 1930, D.P. 1930, 1, 57, note Georges
Ripert, S. 1930, 1, 128, note Paul Esmein (reproduced in Terr & Leguette, supra note 62, at 51925), see Tomlinson, supra note 46, at 1337-51.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 15, 54.
138. The reporting judge reviews the record, researches the legal issues, and suggests in awritten
report how the Court should resolve the case. Unlike the advocate general, the reporting judge takes
part in the Court's deliberations and voting. Lasser, supra note 135, at 1356-57. Reports of the
reporting judge occasionally appear in the Dalloz and Juris-Classeur P6riodique reports.
139. For a remarkable recent study on the unofficial discourse of judicial decisionmaking in
France, see Lasser, supra note 135. Lasser believes that the bifurcation of judicial discourse serves
to mediate between France's historical distrust of the judiciary and the need for socially responsive
lawmaking. Id. at 1403.
140. Id. at 1328.

141. Id. at 1357. Lasser succeeded in extracting from the Court of Cassation a good number
of advocate generals' conclusions. He was less successful with the reporting judges' reports, which
normally remain the judges' own property.
142.

Joele Fosscreau, L'indgterminadton du prix dans les contrats, in Rapport de la Cour de
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Fossereau, long-term distribution contracts, especially those tying a dealer to a
particular supplier, raise issues not addressed by the Code. Thus, to protect the
weaker party (presumably the dealer), the Court had to construct a set of judgemade rules. For Judge Fossereau, the full Court's shift to police iprice-setting at
the performance stage was a modification, but not a rejection, of that approach.
D. Retreatfrom Article 1129(1) in the 1980s
GuillaumeTell and its companion cases demonstrate the problems generated
when a rule applied by the Court of Cassation does not reveal the real basis for
the Court's decisions. The Court's rule-an interpretation of Article
1129(l)-appeared to be that the price term in all contracts had to be "serious,
precise, and objective." The unexpressed basis for the rule was a desire to
protect the weaker party. Even assuming that some suppliers had abused their
price-setting powers,"' the Court's rule was far broader than needed to prevent
the perceived abuse. That difficulty prompted a disorganized retreat by the
Court. This retreat demonstrated that the Court's reliance on Article 1129(1) to
require certainty of price was unworkable. In 1995, the Court finally came to
its senses and shifted articles to require, under Article 1134(3), good faith pricesetting by the dominant party.
The Court's 1991 decision in Baumgartner14' highlighted the disorderliness
of the retreat. As noted by a leading commentator, the Court's decision in that
case attracted considerable attention, very little of it favorable. 4 The distribution contract in Baumgartnerdid not restrict the dealer to a single supplier but
required the dealer to market the supplier's products according to the latter's
specifications. It also required the dealer to generate for the supplier a certain
amount of revenue, while limiting the sales which the supplier could make to
others. When the supplier breached the latter obligation, the dealer sued for
damages. The supplier then invoked the contract's nullity for uncertainty of
price; the contract itself said nothing on the price which the dealer would pay for
the supplier's goods.

Cassation 1995, at I I, I 1.
143. The Court did not have before it any empirical evidence of abuse. In few, if any, of the
many cases decided by the Court did the dealer claim that the supplier had actually abused its power
to set prices. Aynis, Indttermination du prix, supra note Ill, at 26. This disinterest in empirical
evidence reappears when the Court shifted course in 1995. At that time, the Court did not have
before it any evidence of "the devastating effects" attributed to its Pompistes de marque case law by
Judge Fossereau's study. Christophe Jamin, Rseaux intigrds de distribution: De I'abus dans la
diterminationdu prix au contrdle des pratiques abusives, J.C.P. 1996, 1,3959, at 343.
144. Cass. com., Jan. 22, 1991, D. 1991, Jur. 175, concl, Michel JHol, J.C.P. 1991,11, 21679,
note Georges Virassamy.
145. Frison-Roche, supra note 96, at 280. In an earlier, comparable case, the Court had reached
a similar result, but that case had not generated the same "grand bruit' as Baumgartner did. See
Cass. com., Nov. 9, 1987, D. 1989, Jur. 35, note Philippe Malaurie, J.C.P. 1989, 11,21186, note
Georges Virassamy (Sociit4 Graphic).
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The common-law lawyer would readily recognize that Baumgartner is
distinguishable from the Pompistes de marque and Guillaume Tell cases. In
those cases, the weaker party (the dealer) had invoked the contract's nullity,
while here it was the supplier that sought to escape its contractual obligations.
Furthermore, the contract did not appear to be a one-sided contract of adhesion
because neither party was tied exclusively to the other. French jurists also sensed
that the Baumgartner facts presented a different case,' 46 but there was no easy
way for the Court of Cassation to take that factor into account. French judicial
opinions do not cite case authority, and the prevailing judicial style provides no
mechanism for distinguishing a prior case on the facts. Rather, the Court of
Cassation's responsibility is to assure that the lower courts apply the correct legal
rule. In the Baumgartnercase, the lower court (a Court of Appeals) had
faithfully applied the interpretation given Article 1129(1) by Guillaume Tell to
invalidate the contract for uncertainty of price. That result appeared to be correct
because the rule formulated by the Court in Guillaume Tell was not limited to
unconscionable contracts. Furthermore, the Court of Cassation had always
treated the nullity for uncertainty of price as an absolute nullity, which either
party to the contract could raise, and not a relative nullity, as in the case of fraud
or duress, which only the injured party could raiseY"
The dealer in Baumgartnernevertheless convinced the Court of Cassation
to quash the lower court's judgment. The Court's technique for doing so was to
formulate a new rule invoking the distinction, found in Articles 1136 and 1147
of the Code, between a debtor's obligation to transfer (donner) something and
her obligation to do or not do something (faire or ne pas faire). According to
the Court of Cassation, the lower court erred in invalidating the distribution
contract because the parties' obligations under the contract were of the latter
variety; i.e., to conduct their business in certain ways and to refrain from dealing
with certain persons, rather than to transfer something. In Baumgartnerand a
string of cases which followed, 4" the Court applied that distinction to restrict
its rule on certainty of price to contracts involving obligations to transfer. In
applying this new distinction, the BaumgartnerCourt treated the distribution
contract as a framework contract distinct from the subsequent sales contracts,
something which the Pompistesde marqueand Guillaume Tell cases had refused
to do. As a result, the distribution contract itself escaped nullification because
it only included obligations to do or not to do something. While the subsequent

146. This appears most clearly in Professor Virassamy's note on the Socit Graphic case. Cass.
com., Nov. 9, 1987, J.C.P. 1989, I, 21186, note Georges Virassamy.
147. Terr6, Les obligations, supra note 5, n* 280, at 236-38.
148. See Cass. com., Jan. 29, 1991, J.C.P. 1991, 11, 21751, note Laurent Levencur (Rodimond);
Cass. com., July 2, 1991, D. 1991, Jur. 501, note Philippe Malaurie (Facum); and the three cases
reported in D. 1993, Jur. 379, note Jacques Ghestin. These casenotes all discuss Baumgartner. In
these later cases, the Court reformulated the Baumgartner rule to inquire whether the parties'
obligations under the contract were "essentially" to transfer something or "essentially" to do or not
do something.
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sales contracts-the application contracts-did impose on the seller an obligation
to transfer something, the Court added that the lower court could not invalidate
the distribution contract on that basis unless it first determined that the price for
the subsequent sales could not be "freely negotiated and accepted" by the parties.
Under this reasoning (surely a dictum), it appeared that the distribution contract
would still be invalid if the supplier could impose its price on the dealer.
The Court's approach in Baumgartner prompts at least three major
criticisms. First, the Court's new rule seems bereft of any textual basis. If
Article 1129(1) requires certainty of price, that requirement should apply to both
varieties of obligations. Thus, the Court's new rule seems policy-driven-a
transparent effort by the Court to limit the invalidity of contracts for uncertainty
of price to cases-unlike Baumgartner-wherethe weaker party needs protection
from the stronger party's imposition of a price." 9 According to the Court's
unofficial dialogue, the unconscionability of those contracts was what prompted
the Court's much ballyhooed "hunt" for nullities due to uncertainty of price.
Second, the Court's artificial distinction between obligations does not
succeed in differentiating those cases where one party needs protection from
those where neither party does. What does the obligation to transfer have in
common with unconscionable bargains imposed on dependent parties? The
answer appears to be that it has nothing in common. As explained by one
amazed critic, the notion of an obligation to transfer, distinct from an obligation
to do or not do and derived from Roman law, lost its practical significance when
the Civil Code, unlike Roman law, adopted a consensualist approach to the
transfer of property." Under the Code's approach, property passes from the
seller to the buyer by agreement. Thus, the seller's obligation to transfer the
property (the paradigmatic obligation to transfer) becomes, at the moment of
contract formation, an obligation to deliver the property, which is an obligation
to do. As a result, the Code's retention in Articles 1136 and 1147 of the old
distinction between obligations to transfer and obligations to do or not do had
attracted little attention prior to Baumgartner. For nearly two centuries it had
"slumbered away" deep in the old treatises, largely ignored by the courts."'
The Court's effort to revive it in Baumgartnerappeared artificial and formalistic.
Indeed, the criterion for applying it proposed to the Court in Baumgartnerby the
then-Advocate General Michel Jkol struck most commentators as truly ludicrous.152 According to J6ol, contracts for the distribution of simple products,
such as gasoline and beer, imposed obligations to transfer on the supplier, while
the distribution of more elaborate products, such as automobiles or appliances,
imposed obligations to do something, presumably because the supplier also
provided technical assistance. This quaint distinction became the subject of
149.
D. 1991,
150.
151.
152.

For a forceful statement of this criticism, see Professor Malaurie's case note to Facum in
Jut. 501, 502.
Denis Tallon, Le surprenant rvedl de P'obligationde donner, D. 1992, Chr. 67.
Id. at 67.
For Jeol's conclusions in Baumgartner, see D. 1991, Jur. 175.
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considerable merriment, the private publishers of the Dalloz reporter going so far
53
as to label it, rather'grandiously, as the "New Yalta."1
Third, the Baumgartner rule, when it finally reaches the relevant inquiry,
asks the lower courts to make a nearly impossible determination. How can the
lower courts determine whether the parties, bound under a long-term framework
contract, can "freely negotiate and agree" on price? No doubt the Court viewed
that inquiry as the basis for distinguishing between cases where the dealer needed
protection and cases where the dealer did not need protection. Where the dealer
is tied to a particular supplier by an exclusive supply provision, as was the case
in the Pompistesde marque and Guillaume Tell cases, it is very unlikely that the
dealer can do anything but accept the supplier's price. On the other hand, where
the dealer is free to do business with other suppliers or where the supplier has
given the dealer various exclusive rights, as was the case in Baumgartner and in
the earlier Socidte Graphic case, it is more likely that the dealer can "freely
negotiate and agree" on price." Those paradigmatic cases may explain the
Court's obiter, but they do not do much to lighten the fact-finding burden
imposed on the lower courts.
The Baumgartnerepisode also demonstrates how the abundance of textual
rules available to the courts, and awaiting interpretation, encourages judicial
lawmaking. The Civil Code is a grab-bag of highly-sophisticated rules
applicable, directly or by analogy, to all contracts. 5' If experience teaches the
courts that one rule does not work, then the courts shift gears by applying
another, as the Court of Cassation did when it revived the transfer/do-or-not-do
distinction to restrict the certainty of price requirement found in Article 1129(1).
This proliferation of potentially-applicable rules encourages commercial
litigation by supplying parties with numerous bases for attacking contract
clauses."s However, it also provides courts with a wide range of tools for
responding to new problems. As acknowledgedby one commentator, the Code's
drafters had not foreseen distribution contracts, but they had the genius to draft
the Code's basic texts in terms sufficiently generous that it is possible for the
courts to apply those texts to them.'
In doing so, if one article does not
work, then the courts try another. Old rules never die (i.e., never get formally
rejected), but just wither away.
On the negative side, the Court's flexibility in shifting from one rule to
another produces a good deal of instability and delay. Take, for example, the
Baumgartnercase itself. The dispute between the parties arose in the late 1970s.
The lower courts initially refused to nullify the distribution contract for

153.
154.
155.
at 373.
156.

See Ferrier, La d6termination du prix, supra note I II, at 237 n.7.
Id. at 238.
Donald Harris & Denis Tallon, Conclusions, in Anglo-French Comparisons, supra note 89,

157.

See the case note on Baumgartner by Professor Virassamy to Cass. com., Jan. 22, 1991,

Id. (conclusion drawn by authors from proliferation of rules).

J.C.P. 1991, II, 21679, at 187.

1997]

EDWARD A. TOMLINSON

uncertainty of price, finding that it was not a sales contract. That result was
untenable after the Guillaume Tell decision. Unsurprisingly, the Court of
Cassation quashed the lower court's judgment in an unreported decision of
October 5, 1983. On remand, the Court of Appeals faithfully applied the
Guillaume Tell rule, only to be reversed a second time in 1991. Both times the
lower courts appeared to be one step behind the Court of Cassation's changing
case law. Pity the poor litigant whose case is subject to such vissicitudes, all
retroactively applied.'
On the positive side, there was a method to the Court's seeming madness in
Baumgartner."9 What the Court was trying to do was to distinguish between
those contracts where certainty of price should be required and those contracts
where it should not be. To draw that line, the Court placed at opposite ends of
the spectrum sales contracts (certainty of price textually required by Article
1591) and service and construction contracts (certainty of price not required
under the prevailing interpretation of Article 1710). Plainly, the Court was
searching for some formula to distinguish between those two paradigmatic cases.
Commentators had found the basis for the traditional interpretation of Article
1710 in the difficulty of ascertaining in advance of performance the appropriate

price for services or construction work-a difficulty not present in the traditional,
discrete sales contract.'6
Given more time, perhaps the Court could have devised a formula for
distinguishing sales-like contracts from service-and-construction-like contracts,
applying the certainty-of-price rule only to the former. Charitably interpreted,

the distinction framed in Baumgartner between obligations-to-transfer and
obligations-to-do-or-not-do was a first step in that direction. The problem with
this approach, however, is that many modem contracts on the sales end of the

spectrum present the same difficulty as do service and construction contracts.
Long-term distribution contracts provide a prime example. Those contracts,

despite the practitioners' refinement of the framework contract, really are sales
contracts; in addition, it is difficult to ascertain at contract formation the price
for goods to be sold over a course of years. The continued popularity of
distribution contracts thus presented the courts with a major challenge: what to
do with the obsolete rule requiring certainty of price for sales contracts.

Baumgartnerhad defused that rule when the sale price was open in the sense that
the parties could freely negotiate the price. That resolution was incomplete

158.

See the casenote by Philippe Malaurie to Cass. com., July 2, 1991, D. 1991, Jur. 501, 502

(Facum).

159. See Jacques Ghestin, Riflexlons sur le domaine et le fondement de la nullitd pour
inditermination du prix, D. 1993, Chr. 251.
160. Philippe Malaurie & Laurent Ayns, Droit Civil. Les contrats sp ciaux no 766, at 435-36
(10th ed. 1997). For fuller discussion, see the note by Bernard Edelrnan to Cass. le civ., Feb. 24,
1987, D. 1988, Jur. 97 (Michel de St. Pierre). Edelman also discusses the classic case of Whistler's
contract to paint Lady Eden's portrait. For the interpretation given Article 1710, see supra text
accompanying notes 85, 98.
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because the supplier usually seeks a framework contract which determines the
price in cases where the parties can not agree.
E. Shift to Article 1134(3) in the 1990s
The four cases decided by the full Court of Cassation on December 1, 1995
put an end to the adventure in judicial lawmaking initiated nearly 'twenty-five
years previously in the Pompistes de marque cases. One of the four cases
(Vassali) involved a five-year franchise contract, while the other three cases
involved long-term contracts for leasing and maintaining commercial telephone
equipment. "' In the franchise case, the contract required the franchisee (Vassali)
to pay the franchisor's posted or catalogue price for products purchased on the
day of the order. In one of the telephone cases, the contract contained a similar
provision allowing the telephone company to determine the price for any
modifications to the equipment; in the remaining two cases, the contract was
silent on price in one and, in the other, contained an elaborate price term whose
validity the parties sharply disputed. In all four cases, the purchasing party was
tied to an exclusive supplier; i.e., the franchisee agreed to market only products
sold by the franchisor and the telephone subscribers agreed to utilize the
telephone company for any modifications to the equipment.
The lower courts had nullified the contracts in the three cases where the
contract allowed the supplier to set the price. That result was correct under the
prevailing interpretation of Article 1129(1), even though equipment contracts
appear to be rather removed from sales contracts. Equipment contracts contain
elements of several special contracts recognized by the Code (e.g., sale, agency,
deposit, lease-of-things, and service contracts), but the Court's advocate general
believed it preferable to classify them as "unnamed" contracts subject to the
general rules found in the Code.' 62 Viewed as framework contracts, the
equipment contracts before the Court primarily involved obligations to do, rather
than to transfer. That fact, however, did not save the framework contracts'
validity. Under the Court's most recent case law interpreting Article 1129(1),
the framework contract was itself invalid if the parties could not "freely debate
and accept" the price for the application contracts likely to follow.'6 Two of

161. Both the Daltoz and Juris-Classeur Pdriodique reports published the full opinions in all four
cases. See citations in supra note 6. For a translation of the franchise case (Vassalt), see infra
Appendix A.
162. See Michel Jol's conclusions in D. 1996, Jur. at 13, J.C.P. 1996, II,22565, at 21. Jol
recognized that many "unnamed" contracts had acquired the names assigned them in practice (e.g.,
"franchise" contracts or "equipment rental and maintenance" contracts) in the cases before the full
Court.
163. Dictum in Baumgartner treated a framework contract as invalid if the parties could not
"freely negotiate and agree" on the price for the application contracts. See supra text accompanying
note 148. While the Baumgartner Court formulated this requirement only for application contracts
involving obligations to transfer (i.e., to sale contracts), commentators observed that, in later cases,
the Court applied the freely-negotiated and agreed-upon requirement to all open price terms. See the
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the equipment contracts before the Court failed that test because the contract
allowed the telephone company to impose its price for equipment modifications
sought by the subscriber.
These four cases reached the full Court of Cassation following the First Civil
Section's rejection in two cases-both called Alcatel-of the Court's Pompistes
de marque case law. In those cases, decided on November 29, 1994, the First
Civil Section had, enforced equipment rental and maintenance contracts which
allowed the supplier to set the price for subsequent modifications.'" According to the Court, the lower court had erred in nullifying the contract for
uncertainty of price 6" because the contract contained a determinable price (i.e.,
the supplier's quoted price) and because there was no allegation that the supplier
had set prices in violation of its obligation to perform in good faith. The Court
cited Article 1134(3) as the basis for its rule. As is customary in French judicial
opinions, the Alcatel Court did not indicate in any fashion that its new rule was
radically inconsistent with the rule on certainty of price applied by the courts for
more than two decades.
The First Civil Section's rebellion in Alcatel has a respectable pedigree. In
France, staredecisis does not reign; thus, neither the lower courts nor the Court
of Cassation cite precedent as a basis of decision. Rather, a court must decide
a case by applying to the facts a rule extracted from a Code text. Over time,
however, case law rules became well established; the same rule becomes the
basis for decision in countless cases, as happened with the rules formulated by
the Court of Cassation in the Pompistes de marque, Guillaume Tell, and
Baumgartnercases. Nevertheless, these rules do not bind subsequent judges,
who remain free to formulate and apply contrary rules. In most cases, and for
lower court judges in particular, that liberty of interpretation may be no more
than a liberty to decide a case wrongly, and thus to be reversed by the Court of
Cassation. ' " But refusal to apply an established rule may also be a matter of
principle. If a judge believes that the established rule deserves reconsideration,
the judge may prompt that review by refusing to apply it. Thus, the Alcatel
Court surely expected that its deliberate rejection of the much-criticized rule on
certainty of price would prompt reconsideration of the rule by the Court's other

commentary in Ten6 & Leguette, supra note 62, at 712. On the invalidity under Baumgartner's
progeny ofequipment rental and maintenance contracts which allow the supplier to set the price for
modifications, see Professor Ghestin's casenote to Cass. le civ., Nov. 29, 1994, J.C.P. 1995, 11,
22371, at 36 (Alcatel cases).
164. *Cass.le civ., Nov. 29, 1994, D. 1995, Jur. 122, note Laurent Aynts, J.C.P. 1995, 11, 22371,
at 35, note Jacques Ghestin (Alcatel cases).
165. In one of the two cases, the Court upheld the lower court for refusing to invalidate the
contract.
166. Jacques Maury, Observations sur Iajurisprudence en tant que source de droit, in I Le droit
priv6 fran~ais au milieu de XX sifcle; Etudes offertes AGeorges Ripert 28, 49 (1950) (liberty "de
mal faire").
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sections, or intervention by the full Court to resolve the conflict between the
sections." 7 As we have seen, the latter promptly occurred.
The full Court in Vassali and its companion cases decided at least three, and
probably, four things. First, it held that Article 1129(1) did not require certainty
of price.'
On this point, the Court followed the conclusions of its First
Advocate General Michel JMol, that the objet or subject matter of an obligation
did not include its price. That article's definiteness requirement therefore did not
apply to price.
Second, the full Court treated as valid contracts containing a price term
referring to the supplier's posted price. 69 This rule resembles the rule
formulated by the First Civil Section in Alcatel. However, the AlcatelCourt had
treated the seller's posted price as a determinable price satisfying Article 1129,
which the Court evidently assumed to require for all contracts what Article 1591
required for sales contracts. The full Court, on the other hand, was silent on
what Article 1591 might require.
Third, the full Court held that if the supplier abused the power to set prices
under such a clause, the other party could obtain the cancellation of the contract
or damages."7 " The Court cited Articles 1134 and 1135'"' as the bases for
this rule. Interestingly, the full Court's rule, unlike the rule formulated by the
Alcatel Court, condemns the supplier's "abuse" in setting the price and does not
explicitly address the supplier's good or bad faith in performance. This shift
from requiring "good faith" in price-setting (the Alcatelapproach, which used the
same term-"good faith"--as does Article 1134(3)) to controlling "abuse" in
price-setting appears to be ofprocedural significance only. As recognized by the
commentators, French law treats good faith as a factual matter for the trial courts
to resolve; on the other hand, whether there has been an abuse of right is a legal
question. The Court of Cassation does not review factual questions; thus,

167. The Court's Commercial Section had decided most of the Court's cases on certainty of
price. The full Court's intervention, even where there is a conflict between sections, isdiscretionary,
the full Court convening either on its own motion or at the request of a party. Principled rebellions
by lower courts may also prompt a change of course by the full Court. The most well-known
example isJandheur, see supra note 136.
168. The Court applied this rule to uphold the lower court's refusal to invalidate, under Article
1129, the equipment contract with the disputed price term (SocigtdAtlantique). D. 1996, Jur. at 18,
J.C.P. 1996, 22565, at 26.
169. The Court applied this rule, in combination with the third rule, to quash the lower court's
invalidation of the franchise contract in Vassall. D. 1996, Jur. at 18, J.C.P. 1996, 22565, at 26.
170. For this rule, see the first "whereas" clause in Vassal as translated in Appendix A. This
rule, as recognized by First Advocate General JMol, was unnecessary for the disposition of the case
and, therefore, obiter dictum. Given the absence of any rule ofprecedent in France, courts do not
distinguish between holding and dictum. To the contrary, the Court's choosing to formulate arule
not necessary for the disposition of the case seems to highlight the importance of the rule.
171. C. Civ. art. 1135 states an interpretive rule:
Agreements oblige a party, not only as to what isexpressly undertaken, but also as to all
the consequences which equity, custom, or rules of law give the obligation according to
its nature.
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formulating the inquiry in terms of whether the supplier abused its right to set
the price serves to allow the Court of Cassation to review the trial court's
assessment of the supplier's conduct. Thus, the shift in terminology affects the
scope of review but does not change the substantive standard. That standard
remains good-faith performance as required by Article 1134(1). '
Fourth, the full Court held that a contract is valid even if it contains an open
price term; i.e., says nothing about price. The Court applied that rule to quash
the lower court's nullifying the equipment contract with the open price term (the
Cofratelcase). However, in Cofratel,the subscriber had breached the framework
contract by terminating. In holding the subscriber liable, the Court did not
address what happens if the parties subsequently disagree on price. Will the
court set a price for them, or do the application contracts fail for lack of
agreement? That question remains an open one.'
The full Court in Vassali and its three companion cases gave no reasons for
the Court's four new rules. For the reporting judge, Jodle Fossereau, the
devastating effect of the Court's prior case law on the distribution of goods in
France was the primary reason."7 4 Responding to that problem, the full Court
invoked Article 1134(3) to develop a more workable system for protecting the
weaker party to distribution contracts.'" For First Advocate General J6ol, on
the other hand, the primary reason for changing course was the appalling mess
generated by the Court's case law in the years since the Pompistes de marque
decisions.176 The Court's ever-changing rules on certainty of price had caused
much confusion, produced caustic distinctions, and generated insolvable problems
of restitution following the nullification of executed contracts. Therefore, J6ol
invited the full Court to make a "clean break" with its past case law on
uncertainty of price by eliminating from consideration Article 1129(1) and by
relying instead on Article 1134(3)."
The absence of reasons in the Court's opinions makes it difficult to
determine the precise scope of the new rules. Do they apply only to long-term
contracts, such as distribution contracts where it is difficult to determine the price

172. See the forceful argument of Professor Ghestin to this effect inhis casenote in J.C.P. 1996.
II,22563, at 33. No commentators have contested this reading.
173. Judicial price-setting is permissible for certain special contracts; i.e., for agency contracts

and for service and construction contricts. See supranote 98 and accompanying text. For other
contracts, the French tradition isresolutely hostile to judicial price-setting. More surprisingly, courts
are unwilling to use market price as a gap filler, absent some evidence that the parties intended to
rely on the market For these reasons, a leading commentor argues that the full Court did not
validate open price terms. See Professor Ghestin's casenote in J.C.P. 1996, i, 22565, at 28. The
majority view is to the contrary. See Terrd, Les obligations, supra note 5,n*279-3, at 235-36.
174. See Fossereau, supra note 142, at 122 (study published in Court of Cassation's Annual
Report).
175. Id.
176. See Idol's Conclusions to Cass. ass. pln., Dec. 1.1995, concl. Michel Jol,D. 1996, Jur.
at 13, J.C.P. 1996, II,22565, at 21.
177. D. 1996, Jur. at 17, J.C.P. 1996, 11,22565, at 25.
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in advance and where an exclusivity provision potentially puts one party at the

other's mercy, or do they apply more generally? In particular, do they apply to
contracts for discrete sales of land, securities, or businesses? Those contracts,
unlike most framework contracts, remain subject to Article 1591's specific rule
on certainty of price. Of course, a certainty-of-price requirement is "less
troublesome," as even First Advocate General JMol recognized, for single-shot
sales transactions that do not involve successive performances over long periods
of time. 7
On this question, the reasons given by the full Court's reporting judge and
its first advocate general seem to point in opposite directions. For Judge
Fossereau, the primary concern was to protect the weaker party to distribution
and similar contracts, while for First Advocate General JMol the primary concern
was to develop a more coherent law of contract. The former concern seems to
support a narrow application of the new rules, while the latter concern supports
applying them more generally. The language of the opinions also points in both
directions. No doubt the earlier Alcatel opinions were considerably clearer. In
those cases, the First Civil Section held that the seller's posted price was a
determinable price and that such a price term required a seller to set the price in
good faith. 7
Given the generality of that rule, there seems to be little
question that it applied to all contracts, including sales contracts directly subject
to Article 1591. The full Court in Vassali was not as clear. In that case, the
Court quashed a lower court's invalidation of a framework contract containing
a similar price term for the application contracts to follow. One might, therefore,
limit to those facts the validity of allowing one party to set the price. However,
the Vassali Court's lead "whereas" clause (see Appendix A) does not reiterate,
as do the opening "whereas" clauses in the equipment contract cases," ° the
distinction between framework and application contracts. The wording of the
Vassali opinion, therefore, suggests a general rule allowing one party to set the
price, if done in good faith. On the other hand, the Court's validation of open
price terms (rule four) appears limited to framework contracts.' 8'

178. D. 1996, Jur. at 17, J.C.P. 11,
22565, at 23.
179. See citations in supra note 164.
180. The opening "whereas" clause in Cofratelreads:
Whereas when an agreement provides for the formation of subsequent contracts, the
uncertainty of price for those contracts in the initial agreement does not affect, in the
absence of particular legal provisions, the validity of the latter conlracts, abuse in the
setting of price giving rise to cancellation or compensation.
D. 1995, Jur. at 17, J.C.P. 1995, 22565, at 25.
181. Both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Vienna Convention recognize open price
terms. U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1997); United Nations, Convention on Contract for the International Sale
of Goods, April 10, 1980, at 55, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.9 7/18. They do so by a technique familiar to
French law: the suppletive provision. If the parties do not agree on price, the applicable price term
is "the reasonable price at the time of delivery" (U.C.C. § 2-305(l)) or "the price generally charged
at the time of the conclusion of the contract for such goods sold under comparable circumstances"
(Article 55 of the United Nations Convention on Contract for the International Sale of Goods). In
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Read broadly or narrowly, the full Court's decisions in Vassali and its
companion cases signal a transformation in French contract law. To understand
that point, it is necessary to return to the Pompistesde marquecases. The result
in those cases cannot be fully explained by the Court's desire to protect the
weaker party. As noted immediately after the decisions by Professor Ghestin,
one ofFrance's leading contract scholars, the broader problem posed by the cases
was that of the incomplete contract; i.e., the contract which allowed one of the
parties to determine its own or the other party's performance obligation.'
American law faced a similar problem at the end of the last century. At that
time, courts were confronted with new business methods for marketing goods;
these methods included output and requirements contracts as well as various
forms of exclusive dealerships. These new fangled contracts sought to establish
an ongoing, long-term relationship between the parties. By traditional common
law standards, they were incomplete (too indefinite) because they left open for
future determination (often by one of the parties) the full extent of each party's
performance obligations. The parties nevertheless intended to be bound. The
acceptance of these contracts by the courts-Cardozo's well-known opinion in
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon culminated that process-transformed
American contract law.' 3 The hallmark of that transformation was the newlyrecognized obligation of good faith performance.8 4 Courts employed that
requirement-often interpreted objectively-to find performance obligations
enforceable. At the same time, courts interpreted satisfaction clauses to require
the party whose satisfaction was required to act in good faith.'
The good
faith requirement not only protected the other party from arbitrariness, but
permitted enforcement of the contract.
The Pompistes de marquecases and their progeny suggest that French law
had not yet undergone a similar transformation. The courts invalidated as
incomplete those contracts which allowed one party to determine a performance
obligation. By this time, American courts were utilizing the good faith
requirement to validate most contracts with similar provisions. Under this
approach, a party's discretion to determine a performance obligation did not
expose the other party to arbitrariness because the exercise of discretion had to
be in good faith. Thus, courts would uphold the contract, but inquire, at the

both cases, if the suppletive provision applies and the parties cannot agree on price, the court must
determine the price. French law does not recognize any such judicial price-setting, but itseems hard
to blame that failure on the supposed rigidity of Article 1591.
182. Jacques Ghestin, L 'inditermnnation du prix de vente et la condition potestative, D. 1973,
Chr. 45.
183, Waiter E.Pratt, American Contract Law atthe Turn of the Century, 39 S.C. L Rev. 413
(1988).
184. Id.at 419.
185. Steven J.Burton & Eric C.Anderson. Contractual Good Faith: Formation, Performance,
Breach, and Enforcement §2.2.1.1, at 23-24 (1995) (citing construction-contract cases). Recent case
law has objectified the good faith requirement whenever possible. Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v.
Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
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performance stage, whether the party exercising discretion had done so in good
faith. According to Professors Burton and Anderson, the leading scholars in the
field, courts treat as bad faith performance, and, therefore, as breach, efforts by
a party with discretion to define performance obligations to recapture opportunities foregone at contract formation." 6 This recapture analysis of bad faith
remains controversial," 7 but Burton and Anderson appear to be correct in
recognizing that the principal role of the good faith performance doctrine is to
allow judicial control over exercises of discretion in performing.
The new life breathed into Article 1134(3) by the full Court of Cassation
indicates that French law is now undergoing a belated transformation similar to
that experienced by American law at the beginning of the century. Certainly

Vassali and its companion cases shift the courts' role from policing contract
formation under an unconscionability-type approach to controlling a party's
discretion at the performance stage. In other areas, French courts have invoked
the concept of good faith to impose obligations on the parties. Indeed, the recent
flowering of good faith requirements in French law has primarily occurred
through the courts implying new obligations, both at the stages of contract
formation and at contract performance. These obligations are policy-based and,
at the performance stage, require a party to inform, advise, and cooperate with
the other party in achieving the expected benefits of the contract."' This new
body of law treats the duty to perform in good faith as the basis for implying a
contract term, an approach strikingly similar to that of American law."S9
French law is less clear on what constitutes good faith in price-setting. In
its 1994 Alcatel opinions,' the Court of Cassation treated as bad faith a
supplier's abuse of an exclusivity provision to raise its prices to obtain an
"illegitimate profit." That dictum did not reappear the following year when the
full Court decided Vassali and its companion cases; those four opinions supply

186. Burton and Anderson, supra note 185, § 1.2.1, at 4.
187. Professor Summers has argued the good-faith requirement lacks any general positive
meaning and functions primarily as an excluder. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions ofthe Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195 (1968).
His approach, like the French doctrine ofabuse ofrights, emphasizes aparty's motivation, especially
adesire to injure, in determining whether aparty performed in bad faith. The Restatement (Second)
ofContracts has adopted the "excluder" analysis, while the courts have invoked both analyses, often
indiscriminately. I1E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17a, at 402-04 (Supp. 1995).
188. Terrd, Les obligations, supra note 5, n0 415, at 348-50.
189. For good faith as an implied term in American law, see 11Farnsworth, supra note 187, §
7.17, at 365, 368-69 (1995 Supp.). For a similar analysis of French law's treating good faith as the
basis for implying an accessorial duty, see B6nabent, supra note 63, at 294. The most well-known
example is the obligation imposed on carriers to assure the safety of their passengers. Terr6, Les
obligations, supra note 5, n* 429, at 360. In a striking recent decision, the Court of Cassation held
that good faith required a supplier to renegotiate a contract with its dealer when changed conditions
made it impossible for the dealer to survive under the original contract. Cass. com., Nov. 3, 1992,
J.C.P. 1993, II,22644, note Georges Virassamy (Huard).
190. Cass. leciv., Nov. 29, 1994, D. 1995, Jur. 122, note Laurent Aynts, J.C.P. 1995,11,22371,.
at 35, note Jacques Ghestin (Alcatel cases).
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no hint as to what constitutes good faith. To fill this void, academic writers have
suggested that a supplier acts in bad faith when its performance prevents a dealer
from competing with other dealers. 9' That approach, which may have been
what the Alcatel Court had in mind when it condemned a supplier's seeking an
"illegitimate profit," seems unfair to suppliers in requiring them to subsidize
inefficient dealers. 92 On the other hand, the Court's long-standing solicitude
for dealers tied to an exclusive supplier makes it unlikely that the Court will
adopt the Uniform Commercial Code's minimalist approach to good faith. Under
the Code, a party's "posted" or "given" price normally satisfies the good faith
requirement,' 93 thus leaving the protection of the dealer to competition law,
which in both countries generally requires that the supplier charge all dealers the
same price. It will be interesting to see if the more paternalistic French law of
contract will be willing to abandon in this fashion the price-setting terrain and,
if not, what alternative standard it will develop for good faith.
Il1.

CONCLUSION

The twenty-three years from the 1972 Pompistes de marque decisions until
the late 1995 decisions in Vassaliand its companion cases witnessed a whirlwind
of lawmaking activity by the Court ofCassation on certainty of price. The Court
first invalidated contracts whose price term had failed (Pompistesde marque);
then invalidated contracts which allowed one of the parties to determine, or even
affect, the price (Guillaume Tell); next limited the scope of those invalidations
to contracts imposing an obligation to transfer (Baumgartner); and, finally,
upheld contracts which allowed a party unilaterally to determine the price or left
the price open (perhaps), requiring that any price determined by one of the
parties to be set in good faith (Vassili). The lawmaking saga is by no means
over as the Court now confronts the task of defining good faith.
The rapid pace of the Court's case law is largely attributable to the heavy
volume of cases before the Court. The Court of Cassation is the supreme court
on private law matters to a nation of roughly 60,000,000 persons, a nation in
which commercial litigation is relatively inexpensive and quite popular. Unlike
most common-law supreme courts, the Court of Cassation has no control over
its docket; the Court must decide every case in which the losing party seeks to
quash a lower court judgment. As a result, the Court receives each year more
than 25,000 new cases, nearly 20,000 of them civil cases. In recent years, the
Commercial Section alone has decided over 2,000 cases annually.'" This
volume assures opportunities for lawmaking far in excess of those available to

191. Terrt, Les obligations, supra note 5,n* 416, at 350 (citing authorities).
at 162.
192. Vogel, Plaidoyer, supra note 11l,
193. U.C.C. §2-305 cmt. 3(1997),followed by Richard Short Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 799 F.2d
415 (8th Cir. 1986).
194. For the Court of Cassation's case load, see Rapport de laCour de Cassation 1995. at 43746 (statistics for 1988 through 1995).
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common-law supreme courts, which rarely decide more than several hundred
cases annually covering the whole field of law."' Throughout the 1970s,
1980s, and early 1990s, the Court of Cassation, normally acting through its
Commercial Section, received a steady stream of cases raising the issue of the
incomplete price term. The decisions appearing in the private reports constitute
only the tip of the iceberg, selected for publication because the reports'
professional staff believed them to be noteworthy. Few if any common-law
supreme courts receive such a steady flow of cases raising timely legal issues,
and the development of the common law often depends far more on chance; i.e.,
the luck of the draw on what cases reach the supreme court.
The Court of Cassation also receives more help in its lawmaking efforts
from academic writers than do most common-law supreme courts. The Court's
case law prompts an abundance of commentary in legal periodicals, and French
judges cannot complain, as American judges often do, that most of what is
published in the law reviews is of little interest to the courts. 96 To the
contrary, contemporary French doctrinal writing focuses all too narrowly on what
the courts are actually doing. This focus does produce a dialogue between the
commentators and the courts, the Court of Cassation in particular; however, that
dialogue is strangely muted, given the uninformative official discourse of the
Court's opinions. The Court's syllogistic opinion writing style does not allow
an open dialogue between the Court and its critics, but the judges appear to be
quite attentive to the scholarly reactions generated by their decisions. Thus, the
persistent and withering scholarly criticism provoked by the Court's Pompistes
de Marque and Guillaume Tell decisions heavily influenced the Court's retreat
and ultimate reversal on the certainty-of-price requirement.
The lawmaking process disclosed by this saga bears many resemblances to
common-law lawmaking. Code texts do count, as judges care about the wording
of the Code. At the same time, those texts impose surprisingly few restraints on
what judges can do to decide cases fairly-or, as the French would express the
point, to formulate a rule they can apply to decide cases fairly. The weight of
the past (the text of the enacted law) is not a dead weight and may be less of a
restraint than precedent under the more rigid versions of stare decisis. Decisional
law can also serve as a dead weight, particularly if the judges, as did the Law
Lords in England until recently, believe themselves powerless to overrule it.' 9
195. The ability of common-law supreme courts to control their docket through a certiorari
process helps assure that the cases they do decide raise significant legal issues. This factor redresses
somewhat the imbalance in lawmaking opportunities.
196. See Judge Edwards' classic article, Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992).
197. Professor. Dawson, writing in 1968, found the "conception of the force of precedent that
now prevails in England is the most extreme of any to be founo in the modern world." Dawson,

supra note 11, at 80. Just two years previously, the House of Lords had issued a Practice Statement
affirming that prior decisions were normally binding, but recognizing that the House would depart
from a previous decision when it appeared right to do so. (196611 W.L.R. 1234. Prior to that
pronouncement, the House of Lords had considered itself infallible; i.e., powerless to overrule a prior
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Two factors help explain why Code texts, or at least the text of the French
Civil Code, do not freeze the. law, thus preventing a court from resolving fairly
contemporary disputes. First, there is the generality of many Code provisions.
Article 1134(3), which requires "good faith" performance, is a prime example.
That phrase, like our Constitution's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment,
invokes contemporary values."' Good faith, like cruel and unusual punishment, is not just what the judges say it is, but it is also plainly more than what
the drafters thought it was. Good faith is an evolving standard, and judges must
take into account contemporary needs and practices in determining what is good
faith. They will surely do so to determine what good faith requires when a party
unilaterally determines the price.
More important than the generality of Code texts is the second factor oftheir
multiplicity. The generality of Article 1134(3), standing alone, has had little
impact on the development of the law. What has had an impact is the Court's
determining how it relates to the more specific Article 1591. That article
requires the parties to a sales contract to "fix and state" the price. Taken in
isolation, it may be interpreted to require-quite unrealistically under today's
conditions-that the parties agree on a monetary figure in their contract. Until
recently, the courts did interpret that text to require the inclusion in the contract
of a monetary figure, or at least a means for determining a figure (the determinable price). In 1994, in the Alcatel cases, the Court of Cassation changed its
interpretation of Article 1591. It did so by considering how a party's obligation
to perform in good faith affected the price term. The Court concluded that the
parties adequately fix and state the price in the contract if they allow one of the
parties unilaterally to set the price-in good faith, of course. This combination
of the two articles surely would not have occurred to the drafters-the drafters
probably expected the sales contract to contain a monetary figure for the
price-but it does not appear unfaithful to the two texts. The parties "fix and
state" the price by allowing one of the parties to do so unilaterally, but in good
faith.
The multiplicity of Code rules thus best explains the flexibility of a Code.
Viewed in isolation, enacted law texts may severely confine. Viewed as part of
a whole, they provide opportunities for the courts to determine the relationship
between them. Long forgotten distinctions may be invoked to temper overly
rigid rules, as in Baumgartner, and slumbering provisions revived to defuse
overly specific Code texts, as in Alcatel and Vassali. The Code is a grab bag of
available rules, all potentially applicable (directly or by analogy) and awaiting
interpretation. As put more elegantly by a leading comparativist, the subject
matter of a Civil Code has been pondered, debated, and refined by jurists for the
decision. Dawson, supra note II, at 91.
198. A punishment iscruel and unusual if contrary to the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368, 109 S.CL
2969, 2974 (1989) (Scalia, J.)
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598 (1958)
(plurality opinion)).
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last two thousand years.' 9 That conversation does not stop upon codification.
G6ny and Zimmerman are surely correct in treating codification largely as a
matter ofhousekeeping. Proving that hypothesis scientifically is not possible, but
the saga of our three articles at least provides some empirical support.
IV. APPENDIX
Text of Vassali ,v. Gagnaire
Court of Cassation-Full Court-December 1, 1995
The Court;-See articles 1134 and 1135 of the Civil Code
Whereas, a clause in a franchise contract making reference to a tariff in
force on the day of subsequent orders for supplies does not affect the validity of

the contract, any abuse in the setting of the price giving rise to cancellation or
damages;
Whereas, according to the judgment attacked, a Mr. Gagnaire formed a
contract by which he became, for a period of five years, the franchisee of Mr.
Vassali and committed himself to utilize exclusively the products sold by the
latter;
Whereas, to invalidate this contract, the judgment found that article 5 of the
agreement provides "that the products will be sold at the tariff in force on the
day of the receipt of the order, that tariff being the catalogue price applicable to
all franchisees," which is in effect a posted price and from which it results that
the determination of the price is at the discretion of the franchisor;
That in so ruling, the court of appeals has violated the above cited texts.
Quash and annul...

199. Bernard Rudden, Book Review, Times Literary Supplement, July 20,1992, at27 (reviewing
R. C. Van Caenegem, An Historical Introduction to Private Law (D.E.L. Johnston trans., 1992)).

